

**SECURITY CHALLENGES AND INSTITUTIONAL  
INITIATIVES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN**

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## **Abstract**

The end of the Cold created an optimistic atmosphere in Europe. It was expected that the new era would create more security and stability in Europe. But this optimism has not lasted for a long time because of the second Gulf War, the turmoil in Algeria and the crisis in the Balkans. The challenges were stemming from the south, rather than the east and central Europe and they were hard and soft security issues with an emphasis on the later. Western institutions –EU, NATO and OSCE- started initiatives to tackle with these problems. EU, because of its comprehensive approach to security, is the key player. The other institutions can complement the EU's initiative to some extent. All the attempts are highly vulnerable to the developments in the Middle East Peace Process.

## Özet

Soğuk savaşın sona ermesi Avrupa’da iyimser bir hava yarattı. Yeni dönemin daha istikrarlı ve güvenli olacağı sanılıyordu. Ancak körfez krizi, Cezayir olayları ve Balkanlar’da yaşanan gelişmeler, bu iyimserlik havasının fazla sürmesini engelledi. Yeni dönemde tehditler Orta ve Doğu Avrupa’dan değil, güneyden bekleniyor. Sadece askeri tedbirlerle bu tehditleri engellemek mümkün değil, çünkü bir çok problemin özünde ekonomik ve sosyal sebepler yatıyor. AB, NATO ve AGİT bu sorunlarla ilgilenmek için girişimlerde bulundu. Bunlar içerisinde sadece AB sorunlara cevap verebilecek yeteneğe sahip. Ancak, kendi içerisindeki görüş ayrılıkları, kararsızlığı ve ekonomik olarak yük almak istememesi sorunlarda etkili olmasını engelliyor. NATO ve AGİT ancak tamamlayıcı bir rol oynayabilir. Bütün girişimler Ortadoğu Barış sürecindeki gelişmelere endeksli.

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## **List of Abbreviations**

BW - Biological Weapons

BWC - Biological Weapons Convention

CAP - Common Agricultural Policy

CBM – Confidence Building Measures

CEEC – Central and Eastern European Countries

CEP – Civil Emergency Planning

CSBM - Confidence and Security Building Measures

CSCE – Conference on Security and Cooperation in European

CW – Chemical Weapons

CWC - Chemical Weapons Convention

EC – European Community

EEC – European Economic Community

EIB – European Investment Bank

EMP – Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

EU – European Union

EUROFOR - European Rapid Operational Role

EUROMARFOR - European Maritime Force

FIS- Islamic Salvation Front

FLN – National Liberation Front

FTZ – Free Trade Zone

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GMP – Global Mediterranean Policy

IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency

IEEI – Lisbon Institute of Strategic Studies

MENA – Middle East and North Africa

NAVOCFORMED – Naval on-Call Force Mediterranean

NGO- Non Governmental Organization

NPT – Non Proliferation Treaty

MCG – Mediterranean Cooperation Group

MDC – Mediterranean Dialogue Countries

NAA – North Atlantic Assembly

NAC – North Atlantic Council

ODIHIR – Office for Democratic Institutions on National Minorities

OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in European

RMP – Global Mediterranean Policy

SME – Small and Medium Sized Enterprises

UN – United Nations

UNPROFOR - United Nations Protection Force

WEU – Western European Union

WMD – Weapon of Mass Destruction

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## INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an assessment of the security challenges and institutional initiatives in the Mediterranean region. The Mediterranean security perceptions comprise an uneven set of military (hard security issues) and non-military (soft security issues) challenges with emphasis on the latter.<sup>1</sup> The Mediterranean is a region where the West has a number of vital interests. Its main concerns extend to energy security (with a focus on North Africa and the Persian Gulf and in the near future the Caspian basin), regional stability, the containment of religious extremism and the prevention of mass migration.<sup>2</sup>

To tackle with these challenges Western Institutions (NATO, EU, and OSCE) started initiatives towards the region. Because of the root causes of the challenges the EU has the best instruments to deal with them. However lack of political will and lack of cohesion among the member states prevent significant development. The other two institutions don't have the necessary means. Hence their contribution to the regional stability will be limited.

All the initiatives are highly vulnerable to the Middle East Peace Process. The 1991 Madrid Agreement and the 1993 Oslo Accords paved the way for cooperation. Until now none of the initiatives has affected the peace process positively, but they have been influenced by the developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The election of a right-wing party member, Benjamin Netanyahu, as a prime minister after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 seriously harmed all attempts. And now, the

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<sup>1</sup> Roberto Aliboni, "European Union Security Perceptions and Policies Towards the Mediterranean", *Mediterranean Security into the Coming Millennium*, ed. by Stephen J. Blank, US: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999, p.125.

second Intifada has stagnated progress made so far. Without a real solution of the problem a significant progress is not expected in these initiatives.

In this thesis the Arab-Israeli conflict will be dealt with to the extent in which it influences the initiatives. Because none of the attempts aim to solve the conflict. Even Israel, although it is geographically located in the south, is not considered a “southern” country because of its strong economy and huge military power. Also the Turkish-Greek dispute will be excluded, because it is not the main focus of the initiatives and both countries are NATO and OSCE member states, Greece is an EU member and Turkey is an EU candidate country.

Chapter 1 is about the security challenges in the Mediterranean region. During the Cold War the Soviet threat was the main security concern for the western analysts. Hence the definition of security was limited to external, military threats to states. The main focus was the East and Central Europe, and the Mediterranean region was ignored by the institutions.

With the end of the Cold War the Soviet threat diminished and as a result of this a more secure Europe was expected by the western policy makers. But the Gulf Crisis, the Algerian Case and the events in the Balkans proved this expectation wrong. The real threat to European security was not coming from the northern region, but from the south. The new threats were economic and social problems, in addition to the proliferation weapons of mass destruction (WMP) and their means of delivery and the arms race of the southern Mediterranean and the Middle Eastern countries. Hence, the traditional definition of security was insufficient. Security considerations should include economic, demographic, societal, cultural,

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<sup>2</sup> Thanos P. Dokos, “The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Mediterranean: The Threat to Western Security,” *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol:5, No:3, Autumn 2000, p.95.

environmental, etc. issues. Indeed, hard and soft security issues are interdependent and transnational.

At the moment none of the southern countries is able to conduct any direct military threat to the north, either by conventional or unconventional means. However, some of them have necessary means to affect western interests.

The deteriorating economies, the high rate of population growth, the increasing unemployment rate are the main challenges. Because they cause migration to Europe and strengthen fundamentalists at home which brings about other problems with regional implications. Environmental problems and scarcity of sources are also considered seriously.

Chapter 2 provides an assessment of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue that started in 1995. It is a part of NATO's comprehensive approach to security. It consists of political dialogue and participation in specific activities. NATO does not have a good image in the south, it is perceived as a US led military organization which is looking for new challenges after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Even the new missions of NATO create doubts in the south. By this dialogue, NATO aims to lessen the misperceptions of the south and to explain its new missions, and to contribute to confidence building in the region. The dialogue is highly vulnerable to the peace process. Hence its contribution to confidence building will be limited

NATO doesn't have the necessary means to deal with the root causes of the instability in the region: it is a purely military organization without significant financial instruments. The southern states see NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue as a mean to increase economic relations with the rich northern states.

Chapter 3 is about the EU's Barcelona process, in other terms the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The foreign ministers of the fifteen member states of the

EU and of the twelve invited Mediterranean non-EU community countries gathered in Barcelona and started this process in 1995. The Barcelona declaration issued at the end of the conference declared that the objective was to turn the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace and stability and prosperity. The need to respect various principles such as human rights, democracy, respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the other states and the peaceful settlement of disputes was emphasized. Along the lines of the CSCE, the participants agreed to concentrate their future cooperation in three broad areas or “chapters” namely, politics and security; economics and finance; and social, cultural and human relations.<sup>3</sup> Its peculiarity lies in its comprehensive approach to the problem.

The Barcelona Process is the most ambitious and developed of the institutional Mediterranean initiatives. The initiative responded to a perceived need, particularly among the countries in Southern Europe, to address the growing social and economic problems on the non-European side of the Mediterranean littoral. Its main aim is to provide long term stability through economic development. The second chapter of the Barcelona Declaration, which focused on economic and financial partnership, referred to the aim of creating a free trade zone in the Euro-Mediterranean area by the year 2010. It is argued that this free trade zone can reduce the economic gap between the north and the south of the Mediterranean. Economic development is expected to provide positive political and social effects that can bring about more stability and security in the region.

However, in spite of its ambitious goal progress has been modest. Lack of cohesion among the member states, in particular between the northern and southern

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<sup>3</sup> Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 28 November 1995, Barcelona, 1995.

European countries and lack of political will are the main reasons for the slow progress. The process continued despite the fluctuations in the Middle East Peace Process. However, without a solid peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict a significant development is not expected.

Chapter 4 is about the Mediterranean Dimension of the OSCE. It provides a short review of the Helsinki Process and its contribution to the end of the Cold War, and in the following parts it includes an assessment of the Mediterranean policy of the OSCE. The OSCE traditionally follows a comprehensive approach to security. But it doesn't have the necessary financial means to deal with the region's problems and its priority lies elsewhere.

The traditional military confidence building measures which were some of the instruments that paved the way for the end of the Cold War are not applicable to the Mediterranean region. During the Cold War there was a military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, both blocks were in agreement on the status quo of the borders and there was no military conflict among the western Europeans. None of these elements exist in the Mediterranean region. There is a big military gap between the northern countries, not to mention Israel, and the southern Mediterranean states, the Arab-Israeli conflict continues and there isn't a minimum degree of trust among the southern littoral states. A comprehensive approach, with an emphasis on economic issues can be more effective for confidence building, and security and stability in the region. However, unless the Arab-Israeli conflict is solved its success will be limited.

## CHAPTER 1: Security Challenges in the Mediterranean

Since the Mediterranean region links three continents (Europe, Asia and Africa) and represents a very important land, sea and air crossroad, it has been strategically important for European and world Security from the ancient past up to the present.<sup>4</sup>

During the Cold War Mediterranean security issues were defined largely as a function of the Soviet threat.<sup>5</sup> The attention of Western policymakers was primarily focused on the Central Front. The Mediterranean was regarded as secondary of importance.<sup>6</sup> It had been considered Europe's strategic backwater.<sup>7</sup> Beyond the competition with the Soviet Union, the security environment in the South was relatively benign.<sup>8</sup> The Arab-Israeli and Greek-Turkish frictions were dangerous regional problems, but unlikely to pose a direct threat to Western Europe.<sup>9</sup> A direct threat from the South did exist only in the form of terrorism and Gadhafi's Libya.<sup>10</sup> Almost all the security considerations were in military nature, in other words most of them were hard security issues.

The lifting of the iron curtain fundamentally changed the nature of European and even world politics. The demise created an atmosphere for cooperation and

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<sup>4</sup> Anton Grizod, "The Challenges of the Central and Eastern European and the Mediterranean Region for Creating a new European Security Order," paper presented at the Halki International Seminars, Greece, 7-14 September 1996, p. 8.

<sup>5</sup> Ronald D. Asmus, F. Stephen Larabee, Ian O. Lesser, Mediterranean Security: New Challenges, new tasks," *NATO Review*, No:3, May 1996, p.28.

<sup>6</sup> F. Stephen Larabee, Jerrold Green, Ian O. Lesser and Miche Zanini, *NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Issues and Dilemmas*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-957-IMD, 1998, p.1.

<sup>7</sup> Ronald D. Asmus, F. Stephen Larabee, Ian O. Lesser, op.cit. note 3, p.25.

<sup>8</sup> Ian O. Lesser, *NATO Looks South: New Challenges and new Strategies in the Mediterranean*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-1126-AF, 2000, p.6.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p.7.



partnership with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Russia, Ukraine and other countries formerly part of the Soviet Union. So, much of the efforts over the past decade were concentrated on projecting western values in Eastern and Central European states. Despite the difficulties of the transition process to democracy and market economy of these states, a general mood of optimism was achieved there, particularly in security terms.<sup>11</sup>

The Gulf War and the Algerian case showed that the picture in the South was not as bright as that of the Eastern Europe. Also the turmoil in the Balkans darkened the picture. The increasing energy dependency of the European countries to the region was another dimension of the issue. Although it was frequently stressed that - as in the final communique of NATO's April 1999 Washington Summit- security of the whole the Europe is closely linked to the security and stability in the Mediterranean, the issues related to the region remained essentially at the margins of European Security and NATO concerns, much as they had throughout the Cold War.<sup>12</sup>

There are wide a range of security challenges - from the case of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) to air pollution- stemming from the Mediterranean region, and most of them are transnational in character that threaten different areas irrespective of borders and distances.<sup>13</sup> Traditionally, studies on security focused on military and defence issues, such as arms control, terrorism, and the proliferation of

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<sup>10</sup> Gareth Winrow, *Dialogue with the Mediterranean: the Role of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative*, New York, Garland, 2000, p. 62.

<sup>11</sup> Javier Solana, "NATO and the Mediterranean," *Mediterranean Security at the Crossroads*, ed. by Nikolas A. Stavrou, U.S. , Duke University press, 1999, p.36.

<sup>12</sup> F. Stephen Larabee, Jerrold Green, Ian O. Lesser and Miche Zanini, *The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Evolution and Next Steps*, Santa Monica, CA. RAND, MR – 1164-SM, 2000, p.1.

<sup>13</sup> Alessandro Politi, Transnational Security Challenges in the Mediterranean," in *Mediterranean Security into the Coming Millennium*, ed. by Stephen J. Blank, U.S., Strategic Studies Institute, 1999, p.35.

WMD. These are often referred to as hard security issues.<sup>14</sup> This type of definition reflects the security considerations in the Cold War era, which was primarily concerned with maintaining stability and status quo and countering possible external threat.<sup>15</sup>

At present, the traditional definition of security in military terms is inadequate.<sup>16</sup> Advocates of new thinking on security in the post- Cold War era emphasize that the focus of attention should no longer be on only external, military threats to states. They argue, rather, that there is now a need to also include potential threats stemming from other areas – economic, environmental, societal etc – that are referred to as areas of soft security.<sup>17</sup> Soft security issues are factors that can lead to domestic instability, which could then spill across borders and create regional tensions and even conflicts.<sup>18</sup>

Buzan has identified five security sectors: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental.<sup>19</sup> Political security concerns are “the organisational stability of states, systems of government and, the ideologies that give them legitimacy.” Economic security concerns include “access to resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power.” Societal security concerns are involved with “the sustainability, within acceptable conditions, for evolution of traditional patterns of language, culture and both religion and national identity and custom.” Environmental security is concerned with “the

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<sup>14</sup> Winrow, op. cit. note 10, p.24.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Thanos Dokos, “Developing Dialogue between WEU and the Mediterranean Countries: Some Proposals,” *Istituto Affari International*, 1998, p.1.

<sup>17</sup> Winrow, op.cit. note 10, p.24.

<sup>18</sup> Judith S. Yaphe, “Do No Harm: Thoughts on NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative,” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol:10, No:4, Fall 1996, p. 56

<sup>19</sup> Bary Buzan, *People, States and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-Cold War Area*, London: Harevester Wheatscheaf, 1991, introduction cited in “European Union’s Mediterranean Security Policy: An Assessment,” paper presented by Yiannis A. Stivachtis at the 16<sup>th</sup>

maintenance of the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.”<sup>20</sup> All these sectors are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Thus changes in one sector may positively or negatively affect other sectors.<sup>21</sup> In other words security is a multi-dimensional concept.

The transnational and multi-dimensional character of the security challenges in the South signal that even a slightest challenge can cause trouble in the North. What are these challenges? To what extent are they considered seriously? What are the priorities of the North with regard to the security challenges?

### **1.1. Military Challenges stemming from the South**

Though it is widely recognised in Europe that there are no military threats directed from the region, there are a number of factors that represent potential to security and are likely to have defence and military implications.<sup>22</sup> In 1990 the ratio of military expenditure to the gross domestic product GDP of the Arab World was 9.9 percent, in contrast to 4.3 percent in other developing countries, and 5 percent for the entire World.<sup>23</sup> The MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region is the largest arms importing region in the world as final destination of 39.5 percent of all arms import.<sup>24</sup> Just considering the percentage is sufficient to show that the region cannot be ignored.

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Annual Graduate Student Conference: ‘The Changing Face of Europe’ at the Institute on Western Europe, Columbia University, March 25-27, 1999, p.5.

<sup>20</sup> Barry Buzan, “Is International Security Possible,” *New Thinking about Strategy and International Security* ed. by Ken Both, London:Harper Collins Academic, 1991, p.35 cited in Winrow op. cit. note 10, p.24-25

<sup>21</sup> Stivachtis, op. cit. note 19, p.5.

<sup>22</sup> Fernanda Faria, “The Making of Portugal’s Mediterranean Policy,” in *The Foreign Policies of the European Union’s Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990’s*, ed by Stelios Stavridis, Theodore Coulombis, Thanos Veremis, Neville Waites, London, Macmillan, 1999, p.127.

<sup>23</sup> Flippos Pierros, Jacob Meunier, Stan Abrams, *Bridges and Barriers: The European Union’s Mediterranean Policy*, 1961-1999, Great Britain, Ashgate, 1999, p.28.

<sup>24</sup> The Military Balance 1997/98, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Oxford University Press, 1997, p.265.

In terms of military security, the interest of the northern states is twofold: First, they wish to prevent the rise of direct military threats against them coming from the southern states and, if such threats exist, to find ways to peacefully deal with them. Second, they need to prevent the outbreak of a violent conflict among the southern states that would have important economic, political, social consequences for the North.<sup>25</sup>

### **1.1.1. Ceuta and Melilla**

In fact, at the moment no direct military threat is expected from the Southern states, in spite of the dispute between Spain and Morocco over Ceuta and Melilla. Ceuta and Melilla are small Spanish enclaves on the Moroccan coast. The two enclaves have been in Spanish hands since the late 15<sup>th</sup> century (before they had been Portuguese) and are treated as integral parts of the national territory under Spain's 1978 constitution. Ceuta is home over 73.000 Spanish nationals; Mellila to over 63.000 Spanish nationals.<sup>26</sup> The status of these territories still remains an open question, a "window for vulnerability" for Spain.<sup>27</sup> Because, on the one hand the Moroccans, especially the nationalist and Islamist circles, have claims with respect to the enclaves, on the other hand the Spanish government insists that the territories are not a matter of discussion and will be defended by force if necessary. Nonetheless it remains an open question whether any Spanish government would resort to force to

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<sup>25</sup> Stivachtis, op.cit.21, pp.5-6.

<sup>26</sup> Carlos Echeverria Jesus, "Spain and the Mediterranean," in *The Foreign Policies of the European Union's Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990's*, p.110.

<sup>27</sup> Carlo Collatto, "The Decalogue of Spanish Security Policy," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol:2, No: 4, Fall 1991, p.67

assert Spanish sovereignty over the enclaves in the event of large numbers of Moroccans simply entered Ceuta and Mellila and refusing to leave.<sup>28</sup>

At the moment Spain prefers to solve the problem peacefully, hence it aims to increase its relations with Morocco in a variety of fields, including military and defence issues. This policy has been welcomed by the Moroccans, because for them the Western Sahara is the top priority security issue and most of the Moroccan Forces are concentrated on the Western Sahara. But, after a permanent solution to the Western Sahara problem, most probably Morocco will heed to the enclaves.<sup>29</sup> Naturally any redeployment of forces to the north would inevitably provoke concern in defence circles in Spain. A military crisis over the enclaves, between a NATO-EU member state and a North African Muslim populated country, would pose the risk of rapid escalation with serious repercussions for the whole region.<sup>30</sup>

### **1.1.2. Proliferation of WMD and their Means of Delivery**

For the western allies and European governments the main concern is the risk that the non-conventional armaments will proliferate in the region in the middle term.<sup>31</sup> The proliferation of WMD including the means for their delivery at longer ranges has emerged as a leading issue on the post-Cold War security agenda. The experience of the Gulf war, including the discovery of a substantial Iraqi nuclear program, the threat of chemical and biological weapons and the use of *Scud* missiles, brought the proliferation issue to the forefront as well as expert attention. Nowhere

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<sup>28</sup> Ian O. Lesser, *Security in North Africa: Internal and External Challenges*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-203-AF, 1994, p.29.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p.30.

<sup>31</sup> Roberto Aliboni, "Collective Political Cooperation in the Mediterranean," and Jed C. Snyder, "Arms and Security in the Mediterranean," in *Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region*, ed. by Roberto Aliboni, George Joffe and Tim Niblock, London, Frank Cass, 1996.

has the prospect of the spread of WMD had a more pronounced effect on strategic perceptions than around the Mediterranean.<sup>32</sup> As a French observer has noted “A proper regard for security can not exclude the hypothesis that several European cities will be - properly sooner than generally expected- the potential targets of these weapons.”<sup>33</sup>

Islamism with its determined anti-western attitude and a possible pan-Arab nationalism make the situation nastier. The undemocratic character of the regimes in the South is another nuisance. Because it is widely believed in that the authoritarian regimes are adventurous and perceive no domestic constraints on the ability to go to war and they are more likely to use WMD if they are at their disposal.<sup>34</sup>

In fact the Arab World is motivated by primarily by intra-regional concerns rather than the North. Domestic structures of these states and the changes that the end of the Cold War caused in the international system are also important factors for the proliferation around the Mediterranean.

During the Cold war the third World countries were able to exploit the East-West tension by aligning East or West, or by following a non-alignment policy. They were playing superpowers’ interests off against each other. This was a considerable leverage for them in the international arena. By this way they were able to get financial and military aids from the superpowers and to assert their policies in the international system. Alignment and non-alignment served as a potent source of strategic weight for countries across the Middle East and North Africa. The risk of superpower escalation made Moscow and Washington extraordinarily sensitive to the

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<sup>32</sup> Ian O. Lesser, Ashley J. Tellis, *Strategic Exposure Proliferation around the Mediterranean*, Santa Monica, Ca: RAND, 1997, pp. 1-2.

<sup>33</sup> Pierre Lellouche, “France in Search for Security,” *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1993, p.124.

<sup>34</sup> Mohammed El Sayed Selim, “Towards a New WMD Agenda in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: An Arab Perspective,” in *The Barcelona Process: Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community* ed. by Alvaro Vasconceles and George Joffe, London, Frank Cass, 2000, p.145.

regional disputes and this provided to some extent stability for the region and for the World.<sup>35</sup>

The end of the Cold War has meant that the Mediterranean has lost certain strategic advantages that it formerly possessed and that the countries on its southern shore no longer have the means of manipulating East-West tension.<sup>36</sup> They lost an important leverage in the international system. The Russian security guarantee to its clients in the region has disappeared, leaving countries such as Libya, Syria, Iraq and Algeria without any form of external aid. Russia was not eager to and able to provide financial and military aid anymore. Regional powers now must rely on indigenous political and military power.<sup>37</sup> The regional countries felt more vulnerable to their neighbours and to a western intervention.

The pursuit of WMD development has emerged as a leading vehicle for prestige assertiveness, and attention in the post-Cold War world.<sup>38</sup> For some of the Arab countries in the region having nuclear capability –civilian or military- is a mean for prestige in the regional and international context. They are also well aware of the fact that even a fleeting evidence of the ability and interest in acquiring WMD capabilities draws western attention.<sup>39</sup> They want to be taken seriously and they see the nuclear issue as mean for that goal. An Algerian analyst and former high ranking diplomat's words is an evidence for their aim: "In ten years time there will be two countries in Africa which are taken seriously by the United States – South Africa and Algeria – both will be nuclear powers."<sup>40</sup> They also aim to blackmail the West. They signal implicitly or explicitly: "Pay due attention to our regional security concerns /

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<sup>35</sup> Lesser, op.cit. note 32, pp.5-6.

<sup>36</sup> Abdelwahab Biad, "Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean: A Southern Viewpoint," in *Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region*, p.47.

<sup>37</sup> Lesser, op.cit. note 32, p.5.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p.7.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

development requirements / desire for strategic reassurance etc., or else.” Put another way, “How much will you pay me not to go to nuclear?”<sup>41</sup>

The internal environment in key countries in the region also contributes to proliferation dynamics. The obsession with security, both internal and external, gives the military and the associated industry establishments considerable weight. As a result of this even in cases where governments are persuaded of the need to rein in WMD for reasons of regional and international politics, military and industry establishments may balk or argue for clandestine approaches.<sup>42</sup> The previous sentence should not be interpreted as if the governments in the region reject acquisition of WMD completely. Most governments in the region are authoritarian which are backed by the military and they can not solve the numerous domestic problems. They lack legitimacy at home and the ruling elites’ positions are questioned. The WMD issue is a vehicle to distract the public from the domestic problems and to win popular support and bolster the ruling elites’ position.

But the regional factors are the leading motives in the proliferation dynamic.<sup>43</sup> The borders of many countries surrounding the Mediterranean are artificial in nature, reflecting more the whims of nineteenth century European cartographers than the national aspirations of the native populations concerned. It is not surprising, therefore, that the region has been an area of numerous conflicts since the end of the colonial period.<sup>44</sup>

The decades-old Arab-Israeli conflict is the most serious threat to stability in the Mediterranean region.<sup>45</sup> Israel, one of the partners of this dispute is an unofficial nuclear country. It is estimated that Israel may have as many as 200 warheads

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., pp.15-16

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p.9.

<sup>44</sup> Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, op cit note 23, p.19.



consisting of aircraft bombs, missile warheads and non-strategic/battlefield types.<sup>46</sup> It possesses chemical weapons. It is also widely believed that it has biological weapons.<sup>47</sup> It signed but not ratified Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It is not party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). It has a considerable ballistic missile arsenal consisting of *Jericho 1* (1200 km), *Jericho 2* (1800 km) and *Shavit* (7500km).<sup>48</sup> It is also developing air defence system and has cruise missile programs (200-400km).<sup>49</sup> With its long-range delivery systems and satellite reconnaissance assets, Israel is in a position to wage on non-conventional war, relatively immune from counterattacks.<sup>50</sup> While all the Euro- Mediterranean states (also Iran) are parties to Non-Proliferation Treaty, Israel refuses to sign the NPT. The relative narrowness of its national territory, the constant hostility of some states in the region, the balance which would be less favourable to Israel in conventional weapons, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and chemical weapons in the region and the Iraqi case are factors why Israel rejects to sign the treaty.<sup>51</sup> Israel has no desire to give up its nuclear capabilities, for they are seen – because of their deterrent feature – as the ultimate way of guaranteeing the existence of the Jewish state. Israel's stand on the NPT involves not signing it before having signed peace treaties with the Arab states. It would then support the establishment of WMD free zone in the Middle East.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2000 Armament Disarmament and International Security, New York: SIPRI Oxford University Press, 2000, p.494 and SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1994 Armament Disarmament and International Security, Oxford: SIPRI Oxford University Press, 1994, p.316

<sup>47</sup> Selim, op cit. note 34, p.133.

<sup>48</sup> SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2000, op. cit. note 46, p.494 and Pascal Boniface, "Arms Control in the Mediterranean Area: A European Perspective," in *The Barcelona Process: Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community*, p.180.

<sup>49</sup> Boniface, op cit.note 48, p.174

<sup>50</sup> Selim, op cit. note 34, p.137.

<sup>51</sup> Boniface, op cit note 48, p.175.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p.174

On the other hand, Egypt insists on beginning the process of removing all forms of WMD from the Middle East without necessarily waiting for the completion of the peace process. It calls for the simultaneous elimination of all categories of WMD.<sup>53</sup>

Egypt is not party to the CWC. It had employed chemical weapons as early as the 1960s when involved in the Yemeni civil war. Most probably it has developed its chemical-weapons capabilities over the following decades.<sup>54</sup>

Chemical –and biological– weapons are relatively easy to manufacture and stockpile, using low-level technology at low cost. They can be produced for civilian purposes and transferred to military ones at short notice.<sup>55</sup> They are an attractive and cost effective alternative to a nuclear program. That is why they are preferred by some of the third world countries, like Egypt. Egypt, similar to other Arab countries links its accession to the CWC to Israel's endorsement of the NPT and its de-nuclearisation within a specified framework.<sup>56</sup> Egypt signed but not ratified BWC. There is no evidence of major organised research activity.<sup>57</sup> It is a party to NPT and there is no evidence of more than basic research since 1960s. However it is sometimes argued that Egypt must have nuclear capabilities to reduce the risk of future wars between Egypt and Israel. It is claimed that due to the nuclear deterrence none of them would dare to go to war.<sup>58</sup>

Egypt has a significant ballistic missile program. It has evidently redoubled its efforts to develop ballistic missiles that may be tipped with chemical weapons.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Selim, op cit. note 34, p.140.

<sup>54</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman. *Transnational Threats From the Middle East: Crying Wolf or Crying Havoc?*, U.S., Strategic Studies Institute, 1999, p.108.

<sup>55</sup> Selim, op cit. note 34, p. 135.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Cordesman, op. cit note 54, p.109.

<sup>58</sup> Adel Safty, "Proliferation, Balance of Power and Nuclear Deterrence: Should Egypt Pursue a Nuclear Option?" *International Studies*, Vol:33, No:1, 1996, p.32

<sup>59</sup> Assembly of Western European Union, Proceedings, 42<sup>nd</sup> Session, December 1996, 1 Assembly documents (Paris. WEU), Doc. 1453, November 4, *Security in the Mediterranean Region*, report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Lipkowski, Rapporteur, p.39.

Egyptian *Scud-B* missiles have been modified to extend their range from 280 km. to 450 km. The *Badr* missile is also being developed, which could have a range of 850-1000km.<sup>60</sup>

Israel is not the only security concern for Egypt. Sudan is also a problem. Egypt and Sudan were unable to reach an agreement over the strategically important territory known as the Halaib Triangle by the Red Sea since Sudan's independence. The dispute over this area worsened in 1992 when Sudan granted a Canadian company an oil concession. Egypt finally seized the area of land in 1995. This came after Egypt accused the Sudanese of attempting to assassinate President Mubarak in Addis Ababa in June 1995.<sup>61</sup> Egypt also accuses the Sudan government, a strong defender of Islamic ideology, of supporting extremists in Egypt.<sup>62</sup> Control of the water of the Nile is another dispute between the states.

Libya, at present, is not a security concern for Egypt as it was in the past. There is a political rapprochement between the two countries. The country's isolation and internal dissidence forced Libya to seek allies among his neighbours like Egypt. At the same time Libya keeps alive its desire for WMD which cannot be ignored by neighbour countries, also by Egypt. It is party to NPT and BWC but not to CWC. It has sought to develop nuclear weapons. Gadhafi called for a Libyan production of nuclear weapons on April 29, 1990. It continues to train nuclear scientists and technicians abroad. But there is no evidence of progress or success.<sup>63</sup>

Libya is alleged to have an offensive biological weapon (BW) capability or in process of seeking such a capability and it is also alleged to be acquiring chemical

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<sup>60</sup> Fernanda Faria, "Security Policies and Defence Priorities," in *Security in North Africa: Ambiguity and Reality* by Fernanda Faria and Alvaro Vasconcelos, Paris: Chaillot Papers 25, Institute for Security Studies, WEU, 1996, p.36.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p.35

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p.17.

<sup>63</sup> Cordesman, op cit note 54, p.109.

weapons.<sup>64</sup> Chad has accused Libya of using chemical weapons in a war fought between the two countries in 1986-1987.

Libya also has a significant ballistic missile program. It has *Scud-B* missiles with a range of 280-300km. and upgraded *Scud-C* missiles from North Korea with a longer range of 500km. It was also apparently interested in procuring Chinese missiles with a range of 600km. and 2000 km. away. It has also expressed an interest in securing the North Korean *Nodong 1* missile, which has a range of 1100-1300km. This missile can carry a nuclear, chemical and biological warhead.<sup>65</sup>

The unpredictable and anti-western (aimed in particular at the United States) attitude of Gadhafi, his dislike of pro-western behaviour, his opposition to Israel and the nationalist feelings in Libya make the situation uneasy, especially for Tunisia and Algeria.

Libya is the main security concern for Tunisia. In addition to the border dispute, Libya is accused of training and supporting Tunisian Islamists, not in order to promote Islamist ideology but with a view to undermining the internal stability of Tunisia.<sup>66</sup> Tunisia has only small military establishment. It is party to NPT, CWC and BWC. Acquisition of WMD has never been and is still not a Tunisian defence policy option. In case of a conflict it relies on the prospect of friendly intervention from the U.S., Europe or elsewhere in the Maghreb.<sup>67</sup>

Tunisia has been traditionally uneasy about Algerian intentions in the region. Especially the turmoil made Algeria a leading source of risk for Tunisia due to the infiltration of armed Algerian groups, support from Algeria to Tunisian Islamic

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<sup>64</sup> SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2000, op cit note 46, pp. 526-527.

<sup>65</sup> The Military Balance 1994-1995, London: Brassey's, for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994, p.153; Keith B. Payne, "Post-Cold War Deterrence and Missile defence," *Orbis*, Vol:39, No:2, Spring 1995, pp.203-204.

<sup>66</sup> Faria, op cit. note 60, p.20.

<sup>67</sup> Lesser, op cit note 28, p.65.

fundamentalists and the possibility of extension of violence to its territory. Also the WMD and ballistic missile programs under way in Algeria have begun to emerge as a concern in political and military circles.<sup>68</sup> Algeria is party to NPT and CWC, but not to BWC. It had some attempts to create a covert nuclear research program under military control with Chinese support.<sup>69</sup> On August 23, 1998, a Spanish paper, *El Pais* claimed that Spain's military secret service, the CESID, had issued a report to the government on July with respect to the Algerian Nuclear program. The report is said to have emphasized that Algeria had forged ahead with a nuclear program with Chinese and Argentine technical support that far exceeded its civilian needs, despite having signed NPT and concluded that if the Algerian government decided to change its current policy of not acquiring atomic weapons, "the knowledge gathered by a significant number of technicians and scientists, in addition to the availability of facilities... will place this country in the position of initiating a program of military purposes."<sup>70</sup>

Algeria has some research activities with respect to chemical and biological weapons. It is able to produce chemical weapons, but not biological weapons. At present it has no intentions for such systems.<sup>71</sup> Algeria has no ballistic missiles in service or in R&D.<sup>72</sup> But it may be intending to acquire *Scud-C* and North Korean *Nodong-1* missiles.<sup>73</sup>

At present Algeria has concentrated on its domestic problems. The Western circles and Algeria's neighbours concern about a possible Islamic take over in Algeria as well as the current situation. Because such a revolution might have severe

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid. p.67

<sup>69</sup> Cordesman, op cit. note 54, p.104.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid. p.103.

<sup>71</sup> Winrow, op. cit. note p.109.

<sup>72</sup> Lesser and Tellis, op. cit. note 32, p.46.

<sup>73</sup> Lesser, op. cit. note 28, p.52.

implications for the region and for the West. Morocco is the country for which Algeria is the main security concern, particularly, due to the Western Sahara conflict.

In 1975 Morocco peacefully occupied the Spanish Sahara and Spain withdrew from the region. Morocco and Mauritania agreed on the division of the region. In response, the Polisario Front (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saquio El Hamra and Rio de Oro) mounted an active insurgency aimed at the establishment of an Independent Sahrawi state.<sup>74</sup> The Polisario Front was actively backed by Algeria. Algeria also diplomatically recognised the so-called Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic as the ruling authority over the Western Sahara. Moroccan officials suspect that Algeria is seeking an outlet to the Atlantic Ocean via the Western Sahara. In recent years, due to its internal problems Algeria has scaled down its support for Polisario Front. Today, the UN struggles for a peaceful solution, if it fails, the Western Sahara could become a scene of a major confrontation between Morocco and Algeria, if and when the civil unrest in Algeria is eventually brought under control.<sup>75</sup>

Moroccan Armed Forces are the largest in the Maghreb and the most professional and efficient. Morocco is party to the NPT and the CWC and signed but not ratified BWC. It has no interest and intention for WMD and ballistic missiles. Most of its equipment is western origin and superior that of Algeria's.

Mauritania is not at ease with the great size of the Moroccan Armed Forces. Especially it worries about Morocco's claims to the port of Gouera and the security of the rail connection between Zouriat –an important center for iron mining in Mauritania- and the Atlantic Ocean. But due to Morocco's superiority it is highly unlikely that a military engagement will happen between them. Mauritania's army is

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid., pp.30-31.

<sup>75</sup> Winrow, op cit note 10, p.110.

the weakest in the region, in terms of both equipment and manpower. Mauritania is party to NPT and CWC, but not to BWC.

In the Levant Syria is the most enthusiastic state for WMD and their delivery means. It is party to NPT, but not CWC. It signed but not ratified BWC. For Syria peace is a prerequisite for arms control negotiations in the region.<sup>76</sup> In addition to its dispute with Israel, it has also problems with Turkey, over water and territorial issues.

Syria has ongoing research efforts for nuclear weapons, but there is no evidence of major progress. However it is highly probable that Syria is developing an offensive biological capability.<sup>77</sup> Chemical weapons are the most important component of its unconventional program. It is suggested that Syria operates two or three facilities for producing chemicals.<sup>78</sup> It has *Scud-B* and *Scud-C* missiles. It is also known to be interested in even larger range (1000km.) missiles.<sup>79</sup>

It would not be wise to ignore Iraq and Iran in the region while considering the proliferation issue. Iraq's extensive WMD ambitions have been frozen as a result of the Gulf defeat. Presumably it will not be able to equip itself with this type of capability in the medium term.<sup>80</sup> But over the longer term, and in the absence of international sanctions, it would almost certainly seek to rebuild its WMD capacity.<sup>81</sup>

Iran has a very powerful desire for acquiring WMD and the means for their delivery at longer ranges. Maybe it is the best example in the region that has all the third world country reasons for acquiring WMD and their delivery means. Its search for strategic weight, assertiveness and prestige in the region and in the international

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<sup>76</sup> Selim, op cit. note 34, p.154.

<sup>77</sup> SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2000, op cit. note 46, p.526

<sup>78</sup> Lesser and Tellis, op cit. note 32, p.71 and SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2000, op cit note 46, p.526

<sup>79</sup> Lesser and Tellis, op cit. note 32, pp.73-74.

<sup>80</sup> Boniface, op cit. note 48, p.176.

<sup>81</sup> Lesser and Tellis, op cit. note 32, p.14

arena, its domestic problems, the regime, its conflict with Israel etc. are the main reasons behind its motive.

Iran is party to NPT, CWC and BWC. In spite of that it has been frequently suspected of wishing to acquire nuclear weapons. Since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) came into force in May 1994, the IAEA inspectors have not found any proof of a weapons program and congratulate Iran on its cooperation with the agency. However American and Israeli security and intelligence services allege that Iran will very soon be in a position to obtain nuclear means.<sup>82</sup> U.S. government analysts today believe in that Iran could produce nuclear weapons within a 5-10 year period.<sup>83</sup>

A 1999 CIA report noted that, Iran has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons and continues to seek technology to create more advanced and self-sufficient chemical weapon (CW) infrastructure.<sup>84</sup> It is suggested that Iran may have limited capability for BW development.<sup>85</sup>

As far as delivery systems are concerned, the situation is more disturbing. Iran has several hundred *Scud-B* and a hundred or so *Scud-C* missiles. It is mentioned that China will provide technology for the development of 700-1000 km. range missile and it is also mentioned that China, North Korea and Iran cooperate to develop 1500km. and 1700km. range missiles.<sup>86</sup> These types of missiles would allow Iran to target the eastern half of Turkey (almost reaching Ankara).

At present the southern countries are not capable of conducting an unconventional – not to mention conventional- threat to the North. They might have

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<sup>82</sup> Boniface, op cit note 48, p.176.

<sup>83</sup> Chris Hedges, "Iran Maybe able to Build Atomic Bombs in 5 Years, U.S. and Israeli Officials Fear," *The New York Times*, January 5, 1995, p.10

<sup>84</sup> U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Non-proliferation Center, 'Unclassified report to Congress on the acquisition of technology related to WMD and advanced conventional munitions, 1 January through 30 June 1999', <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian-feb-2000.html>

<sup>85</sup> SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2000, op cit. note 46, p.532.



some kinds of chemical and biological weapons, but the ranges and the accuracy of their ballistic missiles are limited (*Scud-B* and *Scud-C* with the range of maximum 600km). The South is more intent on declaring war on itself than on turning its attention to the West and even if it wanted to, it is not in a position to do so.<sup>87</sup> As a result, the most likely victims of missile and WMD are in the South, with the exception of Turkey, a NATO member.<sup>88</sup>

But acquisitions of longer range and more accurate systems, even if they are conventionally armed, can change the picture dramatically, especially for Europe's periphery and with significant transatlantic implications.

First, they can cause huge damage in Europe if triggered in case of a conflict between South and North. Second, as it was mentioned in the previous parts, the region is characterised by actual and potential flashpoints for conflict and crisis that may demand a western response.<sup>89</sup> Any kind of military intervention is the most disturbing thing for the southern states. Hence it is probable that they may retaliate against Europe (and U.S. military facilities in Europe) in case of an intervention whether in the Gulf, North Africa, or elsewhere, perhaps even in the Balkans.<sup>90</sup> As a result of this, most probably the vulnerable states -especially southern European states and Turkey- may be reluctant to commit forces or even to support U.S. action.<sup>91</sup> Hints of this development could be seen in the Gulf experience when the popular reaction in North Africa and then potential terrorist attacks in European soil were matters of concern, especially for southern Europeans.<sup>92</sup> Also, Turkey was anxious due to the Iraqi chemicals and missiles. The Iraqi missile attacks on Israel

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<sup>86</sup> Boniface, op cit. note 48, p.532.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid. p.184.

<sup>88</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, op cit note 12, p.9.

<sup>89</sup> Lesser and Tellis, op cit. note 32, p.3.

<sup>90</sup> Lesser, op cit note 8, p.9.

<sup>91</sup> Lesser and Tellis, op cit. note 32, p.33.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

and Saudi Arabia indicate implications for that more effective systems can also circumscribe pro-western support.

Europe is the natural geographic rear for any military operation in the area, as it was during the Gulf War.<sup>93</sup> Access to the facilities and airspace in southern Europe and Turkey played an important role in coalition force projection. Some 90 percent of forces and material sent to the Gulf passed through the Mediterranean region by air or by sea.<sup>94</sup> But, because of the reasons mentioned above, cooperation among the western allies, in a possible future crisis, can not be as easy as it was during the Gulf war. Especially the freedom of action of the U.S. across the Mediterranean and in Europe can be circumscribed.<sup>95</sup>

Another concern (especially for the U.S.) is about the increasing vulnerability of the fleets – during peace or war time- in the Mediterranean Sea in case of acquisition of more precise systems.<sup>96</sup> The possibility of cascading proliferation of WMD across the entire region, from Algeria to Pakistan is also a disturbing issue.

Although recognising proliferation as a major risk, the Northern states' concerns are focusing on non-military security challenges. It is widely believed that stability in the Mediterranean stems essentially from non-military factors.<sup>97</sup> Economic and social underdevelopment coupled with over population and with the rule of authoritarian regimes bring about instability domestically. Such domestic instability turns regionally into spill over effects that intrude in Europe and affect European security. What is at stake is not national security in a conventional sense,

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<sup>93</sup> Rodolfo Ragionieri, "Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East," in *Mediterranean Security into the Coming Millennium*, p.419.

<sup>94</sup> Ian O.Lesser, *Mediterranean Security: New Perspectives and Implications for the U.S. Policy*, Santa Monica, California RAND Report R-4178-AF, RAND:, 1992, p.8.

<sup>95</sup> Lesser, op cit note 8, p.9.

<sup>96</sup> Stansfield Turner, "The Future of U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol: 3, No:1, Winter 1992, p46.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

but the security of European welfare and the civic order.<sup>98</sup> The most important spill-over effects concerning the North are related to immigration, terrorism and internationally organised criminality.<sup>99</sup> Also the increasing energy dependency of the North to the South is a vital issue.

## **1.2. Non-military Challenges Stemming from the South**

### **1.2.1. Increasing Economic Gap**

There is a big economic gap between the North and the South, and this gap is widening day by day. In 1992, the World Bank estimated the ratio of GDP per capita of European Community to that of the South to be 12 to 1, a number expected to grow to 20 to 1 by 2010.<sup>100</sup> At present GDP per head with a figure of 19.242\$ for the European Union member states and 1589\$ for southern Mediterranean countries.<sup>101</sup> There variety of reasons for the bad economy of the region.

After declaring of their independence, the southern states developed industrial policies based on heavy state intervention and protectionism. In theory, protectionism was intended to help the growth of infant industries by enabling them to compete with foreign producers on the domestic market. At the beginning it seemed as if this policy worked. However there was a price to be paid. Because protectionism hindered competition and in the absence of competition input factors such as labour and capital tend to be more expensive resulting in higher prices for consumer, a poor allocation of sources, and lower productivity.<sup>102</sup> Later on the

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<sup>98</sup> Roberto Aliboni, "European Union Security Perceptions and Policies towards the Mediterranean," in *Mediterranean Security into the Coming Millennium*, pp. 127-128.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.p.128.

<sup>100</sup> Pierros, Jacob and Abrams, op cit note 10, p.35.

<sup>101</sup> Richard G. Whitman, "Core, Periphery and Security in Europe," *International Studies Association*, March 1998, p. 10.

<sup>102</sup> Pierros, Jacob and Abrams, op cit note 10, p.35

governments were no longer able to pump money into the under-performing state enterprises due to their increasing debts.<sup>103</sup>

The weakness of the economic relations among the southern countries is another reason for their economic backwardness. The intra-regional trade is variously estimated at 4 to 8 percent of total trade.<sup>104</sup> There are some reasons for this situation. First, rivalries, confrontation and question of hegemony prevented the states form economic relations. The question of who will gain more was an important impediment. There was/is no mutual trust among them. It is clear that rational economic development and cooperation can not develop in the absence of minimum of trust and good faith between the partners.<sup>105</sup> Second, production in the countries in the area is not complementary – mainly hydrocarbons, textiles, vegetables and citrus fruits- which means limited trade.<sup>106</sup> Third, the technological capacity of the area is unable to respond to its needs which must be met from the outside region. Due to its geographic proximity and historical ties the EU is the best ‘outside region’.

Most of their trade is conducted with the EU states. They are highly dependent on EU markets, which is best captured by statistics: 55.7 percent of Southern export is sold to the EU and 51.7 percent of their imports originated in the EU. In contrast, the EU is far less dependent – with the exception of oil products and gas- on trade with its southern neighbours: only 9.3 percent of the EU export reached to the region, and imports from the South amount to only 7.2 percent of EU’s total.<sup>107</sup> The proportions of European trade accounted for North America and the Far East are

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid.p.25

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.p.23.

<sup>105</sup> Michel Chatelus, “Economic Cooperation Among Southern Mediterranean Countries,” in *Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region*, p.88.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.p.88.

<sup>107</sup> European Report no: 2195, cited in *Bridges and Barriers*, op cit note 10, p.22.

each almost double than that of the Mediterranean.<sup>108</sup> As a result of this the southern states are at the mercy of the EU's economic performance and its trade laws –quotas, customs' tariffs, export schedules, target prices, and quality standards.<sup>109</sup> Robust growth in Europe leads to greater demand for imports, benefiting the South, but slow growth has an opposite, negative effect. Although quotas and tariffs for most industrial products have been eliminated, textile products are still being subject to some constraints and entry of agricultural products is restricted by the measures laid out in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the two fields in which the South is in a advantageous position to some extent.<sup>110</sup>

Lack of foreign direct investment is another reason for the economic backwardness of the South. It attracts only about 3 percent of the world's foreign direct investment.<sup>111</sup> The region as whole lacks comparative advantage for the foreign investor, when compared with Latin America, South and South East Asia and –with the end of the Cold War- Eastern Europe.<sup>112</sup> Political and economic environment makes this part of the world undesirable for the investor.

Political instability, bad governance, the bureaucratic nature of the states, absence of independent and effective legal systems, possibility of state intervention, lack of predictable long term perspective, reluctance of commercial banks to loan money, high level of corruption, lack of transparency in business life, lack of trained accountants and financial analysts, and lack of reliable data, high prices, low wages,

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<sup>108</sup> Tim Niblock, "North-South Economic Relations in the Mediterranean," in *Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region*, pp.118-129.

<sup>109</sup> Hafeedh Zaafrane, Anzem Mahjoub, "The Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone: Economic Challenges and Social Impacts on the Countries of the South and East Mediterranean," in *The Barcelona Process: Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community*, p.31.

<sup>110</sup> Pierros, Jacob and Abrams, op cit note, p.35, p.23.

<sup>111</sup> Stelios Stavridis and Neville Waites, "The European Union and the Member States," in *The Foreign Policies of the European Union's Mediterranean States and the Applicant Countries in the 1990s*, p.28.

<sup>112</sup> George Joffe, "Foreign Investment and the Role of Law," in *The Barcelona Process: Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community*, p.33 and Biad op. cit. note 36, p.47.

shortage of job, unwillingness of the governments to make effective reforms with respect to privatisation and liberalisation, terrorism, conflicts among the states are some of the factors for the reluctance of the investors.<sup>113</sup> Indeed, without adequate investment, it is unlikely that these states can resolve their internal social problems, let alone begin to match the patterns of development experienced by the countries of the developed world or of the rapidly developing world.<sup>114</sup>

Also the money spent for armaments has had negative effects for the economic situation of the South. Security issues were utmost important for the states in the region, while economic considerations were viewed as entirely subordinate to them and used only to support to them. Military expenditures take up a far greater proportion of GNP than anywhere else in the world. Most foreign currency is spent on arms imports and skilled personnel are employed in defence and this means that valuable skilled workers are lost to the civilian economy.<sup>115</sup>

### **1.2.2. Population Growth and Migration**

In addition to the bad economy, the high rate of the population growth causes anxiety for Europe, especially for the southern Europe. Since 1960 population of the region is increasing rapidly as a result of medical advances, better hygiene and increased food supplies. Today, while the population of the northern shore is growing by less than 0.3 percent per annum, the population on the southern shore is increasing by more than 2.5 percent per annum.<sup>116</sup> By the year 2015 the total population of the fifteen EU members will increase by only 13 million, while the

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<sup>113</sup> Joffe, op cit note 112, p.33 and Winrow op. cit. note 10, pp. 98-104.

<sup>114</sup> Joffe, op cit note 112, p.38.

<sup>115</sup> Chatelus, op. cit note 105, .89.

<sup>116</sup> Niblock, op. cit note 108, p.126.

non-EU Mediterranean will number an additional 170 million people.<sup>117</sup> In 1950 two thirds of the population of the Mediterranean basin lived on its northern shores, by 2025 it is estimated that the situation will have completely reversed itself.<sup>118</sup> Overpopulation increases unemployment and poverty which causes migratory pressures to Europe.

In the post-war years, due to the labour shortage, immigration was welcomed by the European countries –notably by West Germany, France, Belgium, Switzerland and Great Britain. The sending countries were also satisfied for two reasons: emigration was a pressure valve that helped keep rising unemployment in check, and worker remittances were an important source of income to the national economy. But the growing unemployment and economic stagnation after the 1973 oil crisis forced the European countries to follow tighter immigration policies and even a repatriation program.<sup>119</sup>

However, today, the EU member states are home to 4.6 million immigrants from the non-member Mediterranean states.<sup>120</sup> The presence of a large and growing Muslim population has sparked rise in a xenophobic and racist sentiment amongst the Europeans, particularly in the light of high unemployment rates.<sup>121</sup> The European governments themselves are greatly concerned about the racist and xenophobic events, because they are harmful for their domestic security and they have implications in their relations with the South. Any event in the North is perceived as an evidence of a fundamental European-Christian hostility towards Islam, as a result of this Islamic movements, both, in Europe and in the South gains power with

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<sup>117</sup> Theodore Couloumbis, Thanos Veremis, “Introduction: The Mediterranean in Perspective” in *The Foreign Policies of the European Union’s Mediterranean States and the Applicant Countries in the 1990s*, p.4.

<sup>118</sup> Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, op cit note 23, p.11.

<sup>119</sup> Stavridis and Waites, op. cit note 111, p.30.

<sup>120</sup> Whitman.op. cit note 101, p.11.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid, p.32.

significant implications in international relations.<sup>122</sup> Another concern for the governments in the North is that immigration creates an environment in which terrorists are able to move with relative ease.<sup>123</sup>

Indeed, zero immigration is self-defeating. With the birth rate stagnant or in decline in many European countries, some immigration will be necessary to prevent the population from decreasing in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>124</sup> Also there is a need for unskilled labours which the Europeans loath to perform and the immigrant workers currently occupy.<sup>125</sup> But the flow must be under control. The EU, with its hundreds of kilometres of coastlines, is vulnerable to illegal immigration. Today, it is estimated that 1.3 to 1.5 million undocumented immigrants reside in Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal.<sup>126</sup> Because of the high unemployment, low living standards, and political turmoil in the South, it is highly unlikely that illegal immigration will stop. A political turmoil may also cause a refugee flux, the most dreadful thing for the Europeans.

### **1.2.3. The Algerian Turmoil**

At present, the states in the South consist of authoritarian governments headed by powerful individual rulers –a president or a hereditary king- backed by politically and economically influential elite groups. There are usually few constitutional constraints on the powers of these authoritarian heads of state. They are often able to appoint key ministers, rule by decree and declare state of emergency. Apparently there is little or no democracy. Only certain political parties are tolerated and only those parties closely associated with the president or the king are usually most

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<sup>122</sup> Aliboni, op. cit note 28, pp.129-130

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, op cit note 23, p.34.

<sup>125</sup> Niblock, op. cit. note 108, p.121.



successful. There are close ties between the governing elites and the leading military officers. Public opinion is ostensibly of marginal importance.<sup>127</sup>

The bad economic condition, high unemployment rates, high inflation, poverty, the deteriorating living conditions, the housing problem, insufficient welfare system, corruption of the ruling elites, the repression of people and human right abuses, no tolerance for political opposition groups and the lack of rapid improvement of the situation cause social unrest in the South. The public has begun to question the legitimacy of the ruling elites.<sup>128</sup> The leaders are under increasing pressure from their own publics to introduce solid economic and social reforms. But they are not prepared to make serious attempts that could damage the interest of those pro-government bureaucrats and other elite groups who have benefited from the lack of reforms hitherto.<sup>129</sup> As a result of this, the Islamists benefit from the current situation. The failure of various secular regimes to deliver on the promises of material prosperity and improved education and welfare made over many years diminish their credibility.<sup>130</sup> Also the West is accused because of its support for the governments. In this sense, the rise of radical Islam is a result of anger towards governments and resentment against the West.<sup>131</sup>

Although an Islamic take over is not expected in the foreseeable future, the Europeans and the governments in the south are apprehensive for the rise of radical Islamism in the region. The Algerian case is the main reason for their concern.

In Algeria, the National Liberation Front (FLN), the leader of the long and bloody independence war against French colonialism in the period of 1954-1962 was

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<sup>126</sup> Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, op cit note 23, p.33.

<sup>127</sup> Winrow, op cit note 10, pp.72-73

<sup>128</sup> Faria, op cit. note 60, p.125.

<sup>129</sup> Winrow, op cit note, p.80.

<sup>130</sup> Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, op cit. note 23, p.42.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid, p.15.

on power since independence. In the post-independence period the economic and social condition in the country was malign. Due to the decline in the world oil prices in 1985-86 the economic situation in Algeria –which was/is highly dependent on the export of hydrocarbons- deteriorated significantly. Even basic goods such as eggs were frequently unavailable. Products found in the local markets were so highly priced that ordinary wage earners could not afford them. In addition to this, widespread corruption in the country made the situation worse.

As a result of this, widescale demonstrations and bloody rioting occurred in 1988. In response the government amended the constitution and opened up the political system to political parties other than the ruling FLN and promised elections. The new constitution also included provisions referring in the removal of the armed forces from political life which had been at the center of every government since Algeria won its independence. The amendment allowed Algeria's Islamist groups to come to the political forefront.

The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was the most organised and effective opposition party. It was able to mobilise large masses, particularly unemployed urban people, with the help of its organisational framework and of the network of mosques it controlled, by making populist propaganda against the existing regime and by presenting itself as the only proper and alternative to the ruling elite.

In the June 1990 local elections, the FIS, by capitalising on the popular hatred for the FLN, won control of thirty-two of the forty-eight provinces. In other words it got 55 percent of the votes cast. Later on it was victorious again in the first round of the National Assembly elections in December 1991, polling 47 percent of the vote. As result of this, the military which was deeply against to the Islamist and to their agenda and fearful of their own fate, intervened and cancelled the second round.

The military leaders established their own ruling body: the High State Committee (HSC) and formally dissolved the FIS as a political party in March 1992. Consequently clashes between the security forces and the Islamist began. Groups, linked to the FIS or other Islamist elements that have never enjoyed the constitution or the electoral system of the government, launched armed assaults against the regime and its supporters. Anyone perceived to be supportive of the government or critical of Islamism began to be attacked: ministers, intellectuals, journalists, writers and foreigners living in Algeria. Until now more than one hundred thousand people were killed on all sides -although it was not a civil war because masses did not go to the streets and support the terrorist activities.<sup>132</sup>

At the early days of the turmoil a high level of migration was expected towards North –particularly France, Spain, Portugal and Italy- and to neighbour countries –Morocco and Tunisia- but it did not happen. But the picture, when the Islamist terrorism in Europe considered was not so good. Algerian Islamists with the help of their supporters in Europe carried out some terrorist activities against the states supporting Algerian ruling elites, such as the hijacking of Air France jet in 1994 and the terrorist events in Paris in 1995-1996.<sup>133</sup>

#### **1.2.4. Terrorism and Organizational Crime**

One of the most worrisome things for the European as well as the southern countries is terrorism. European countries are fearful of being targets of Muslim fundamentalist terrorism, but more so the US or US targets in Europe. The proximity of the terrorism supporting states (Libya, Sudan, Syria, Iran, and Iraq) makes the

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<sup>132</sup> see Michael Willis, “The Islamist Movements of North Africa,” in *Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region* and William Lewis, “Algeria and the Maghreb at the Turning Point,” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol:1, No:3, Summer1990.

<sup>133</sup> Lesser, op cit note 8, pp.11-12.

situation more serious.<sup>134</sup> It is estimated that one third of all terrorist activities worldwide take place in the region.<sup>135</sup>

Terrorism is closely linked up with international criminality which traffics in human beings, armaments and drug. Most probably the economic resources generated by organised crime are use for destabilising the society, the political system, the administration and the economy of the country. Particularly drugs are a direct and a very serious threat to the social foundations of states. There are important drug producing areas in the region, for example Morocco is the major source for hashish.<sup>136</sup> The Mediterranean and the Balkans constitute for major transit route for drug trafficking to Western European countries.<sup>137</sup> Turkey and Spain are the two of the three major drug trafficking entry points (the other one is Russia). The disappearance of border controls among the EU states is a critical factor with regard to the drug trafficking. Today, surface trade between Morocco and Germany, for example, has to pass only one international border.<sup>138</sup>

#### **1.2.5. Environmental Problems**

Environmental problems in the region are also seriously considered by the North. Once beautiful shores are deteriorated due to poorly planned development. The rich Mediterranean vegetation and the unique landscape are replaced by unpleasant urban, industrial, and tourist complexes.<sup>139</sup> Untreated sewage from these

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<sup>134</sup> George Joffe, "Low-level Violence and Terrorism," in *Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region*, p.29.

<sup>135</sup> Ellen Laipson, "Thinking about the Mediterranean," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol:1, No:1, Winter 1990, p.56.

<sup>136</sup> Jesus, op. cit note 26, p.103.

<sup>137</sup> Thanos Dokos, "Security Problems in the Mediterranean," paper presented at the Halki International Seminars, Greece, 7-14 September 1996, p.8.

<sup>138</sup> Volker Perthes, "Germany and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Gradually becoming a Mediterranean State," *EuroMeSCO Papers*, February 1998, p.2.

<sup>139</sup> Zivorad Kovacevic, "The Environmental Problems facing the Mediterranean Basin," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol:1, No:3, Summer 1990, p.1.

facilities flows directly into the Mediterranean. In addition to this, oil pollution caused both by accidental spills and by the deliberate dumping of oil-contaminated sea water (routine dumping to clean the tanks of ships) harm the lives of the region's inhabitants and harm the health of people who consume seafood. Over fishing, especially by giant nets contribute to the depletion to fish stocks as well as to death of thousands of other sea animals that entangle. Agricultural activities also contribute to degradation of the Mediterranean environment. Overuse of arable land, combined with poor irrigation, particularly in the South, leads erosion, salinisation, and occasionally outright desertification.<sup>140</sup> Deforestation due to fires, overgrazing and the deliberate burning of shrublands and grasslands is also a nuisance. The presence of nuclear power plants – not to mention the nuclear powered ships and submarines in the Mediterranean Sea itself- is another cause of worry.<sup>141</sup>

The North, particularly France, Italy and Spain are alone responsible for 70 to 80 percent of all the pollution in the Mediterranean basin and 85 percent of the region's industrial production. However, the South is accused of the environmental problems facing the Mediterranean. The southern states are responsible for 15 percent of industrial production but 20-30 percent of its pollution. This means that they are proportionally bigger polluters than their European counterparts.<sup>142</sup>

#### **1.2.6. Scarcity of Water**

Perhaps the most critical environmental problem facing the region is the lack of water resources.<sup>143</sup> Because of the rapid population growth, water resources in the

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<sup>140</sup> Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, op cit note 23, p.39

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid. p.37.

<sup>143</sup> Robert J Lempert and Gwen Franswarth, "The Mediterranean Environment. Prospects for Cooperation to Solve the Problems of the 1990s," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol:5, No:4, Fall 1994,p.121

Mediterranean basin are becoming increasingly scarce and expensive. It is suggested that the time is coming when water must be treated as a valuable resource, like oil, not a free one like air.<sup>144</sup> The solutions found to this problem are not effective. Dispute over the ownership of water are becoming common; rivers and underground waters do not stop at national borders. There is already friction among Turkey, Syria and Iraq for the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, among Israel, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine for the waters of Litani, Yarmouk and Jordan rivers and among Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia for the Nile rivers.<sup>145</sup> The governments of Syria, Egypt and Jordan have announced on numerous occasions their willingness to go to war to protect their water supplies.<sup>146</sup> The North not only concerns about a possible conflict stemming from the ownership issue, but also the effects of water to the industrialisation of the southern states.

### **1.2.7. Energy Security**

Energy security is the most important issue that the Europeans are concerned about. It is highly probable that any problem in the South or between North and South could have serious repercussions for Europe, but any disruption in the oil or natural gas flow will be the worst case. Because Europe is heavily dependent on the MENA for its energy supplies, as nearly as 60 percent of its needs in hydrocarbon supplies come from there.<sup>147</sup> Approximately 3000 ships daily pass through the Mediterranean and meet the demands of the European states.<sup>148</sup>

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<sup>144</sup> Water: Flowing Uphill, *the Economist*, 12 August 1995, p.38.

<sup>145</sup> Dokos, op cit. note 132, p.8.

<sup>146</sup> Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, op cit note 23, p.22.

<sup>147</sup> Jesus, op. cit. note 26, p.98.

<sup>148</sup> Nicola de Santis, "The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative," *NATO Review*, Vol: 46, No: 1, Spring 1998, p.3.

Europe (particularly southern European states) depends on North Africa for roughly 25 percent of its natural gas. 74 percent of Spain's natural gas needs, 50 percent of Italy's, 29 percent of France's, 10 percent of Portugal's are imported from the Maghreb. Most of these supplies reaches Europe through two routes, the Trans-Med line (inaugurated in 1986) linking Italy and Algeria (the owner of the fifth natural gas reserve in the world) via Tunisia and the new Trans-Maghreb pipeline (1996) supplying Algerian gas to Spain and Portugal (as well as France, Belgium, and Germany) via Morocco. It is also planned to expand the existing Libya-Italy link. The fixed infrastructure and the far less flexibility to respond the supply interruptions make the natural gas issue more sensitive than the oil.<sup>149</sup> Even though a deliberate cut off is not expected, any interruption as a result of a turmoil or anarchy is not ignored.<sup>150</sup>

It is also considered that the importance of the Mediterranean as a major transit route for the transportation of energy products will increase after the construction and operation of pipelines transporting oil from Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.<sup>151</sup>

The large number and different kinds of security challenges force the northern and southern states to make cooperation. The Europeans are well aware of the fact that costs of taking no action will be much higher in the long run than are the costs of taking action.<sup>152</sup> Domestic pressure is also an important impetus. Political radicalism and growing violence, the authoritarian nature of regimes, and numerous violations of human rights put the European governments under public pressure to develop

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<sup>149</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini op. cit. note 12, pp. 10-11; Jesus, op. cit. note 26, 110; Faria, op. cit. note 22, p. 131; Lesser, op. cit. note 8, p.20

<sup>150</sup> Lesser, op cit note 8, p.21

<sup>151</sup> Dokos, op cit. note 132, p.8.

<sup>152</sup> Stephen C. Calleya, "The Establishment of Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Center," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol: 11, No: 2, Spring 2000, p.82.

policies for the region.<sup>153</sup> On the other side of the Mediterranean, the governments are under increasing pressure from outside (from the west in particular) and from below (from their own public) to introduce serious political and economic reforms.<sup>154</sup> They cannot anymore exploit the east-west tension and call their patrons in case of a trouble. It is evident for them that there are solid problems which they can not deal with unilaterally, therefore cooperation with the North is vital.

The end of the Cold War has lifted many of the constraints on regional cooperation in the Mediterranean. The opening of the Arab-Israeli peace talks in 1991 and the subsequent moves towards Arab-Israeli settlement created a better climate for cooperation. The Algerian case with its serious implications on both sides of the Mediterranean showed that a multilateral and comprehensive approach is vital for the security and stability of the whole region.

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<sup>153</sup> Faria, op cit. note 60, p.126.



## **CHAPTER 2: NATO's Mediterranean Initiative**

### **2.1. NATO and the Mediterranean in the Cold War**

During the Cold War, the Mediterranean played a marginal role in the East-West strategic competition and NATO strategy. NATO officials were much more concerned with a possible development in the Central front and the East.<sup>155</sup> The principal focus in the Mediterranean was to limit Soviet influence in the area. There was a competition between NATO and the Warsaw Pact to secure the support of the governments in North Africa and in the Middle East.<sup>156</sup>

The Soviet Union attempted to gain political influence in states such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Syria. It was seeking to present itself as the champion of the forces of decolonisation and anti-Western imperialism. Particularly this policy was more evident in Moscow's military, political and economic support for Egypt.<sup>157</sup>

In 1964 to show its flag and to counter the US Sixth Fleet, the Soviet Union established the Fifth Eskadra in the Mediterranean. By 1973 the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean was at its peak.<sup>158</sup> The Atlantic Alliance was determined to keep the Soviet Union away from securing access to and use of naval bases in the area. NATO officials feared that the Soviet Union could threaten the lines of communication and disrupt trade routes. The safety of the energy flow from the Persian Gulf, the Middle East and North Africa was very important in the thinking of

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<sup>154</sup> Winrow, op cit note 10, p.27.

<sup>155</sup> Lesser, op cit. note 8, p.5.

<sup>156</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p. 49.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid. p.54

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

many NATO policy-makers.<sup>159</sup> Unlike the US Sixth Fleet, the Fifth Eskadra failed to obtain full base rights in the Mediterranean with the exception of the Egyptian port of Alexandria until 1972. It had only limited access rights some ports in Libya, Algeria, Malta and Syria. As a result of this the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean declined after 1973 and the Soviet naval threat diminished.<sup>160</sup>

In response to the Soviet Union's growing interest in the Mediterranean, in 1961 NATO set up an Expert Working Group on the Middle East and the Maghreb and in 1967 an Ad Hoc Group on the Mediterranean. Composed of area specialists from allied countries, these groups conducted traditional monitoring of Soviet related activities, as well as assessments of region specific issues.<sup>161</sup> Also in 1968 NATO decided to establish a Maritime Airforce in Naples to coordinate surveillance in the Mediterranean and in 1969 agreed to deploy a naval call-on-forces for the Mediterranean, NAVOCFORMED.<sup>162</sup>

In fact, at the time of the Cold War the main challenge NATO faced in the Southern Region did not stem from the Soviet Union or other non-NATO states in the area. The main challenge was rather one of internal management. This was because of different political interests and national concerns of member states in vast territory stretching from the Azores to Ardahan in eastern Turkey.<sup>163</sup> Particularly there were differences of opinion among the allies concerning how to respond to conflicts and crises in and around the Mediterranean, which is closely related to the out-of-area issue.<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>159</sup> Ibid. p.51.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid. p.54.

<sup>161</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, op. cit. note 6, p.45.

<sup>162</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, pp. 54-55.

<sup>163</sup> John Chipman, "Allies in the Mediterranean, Legacy of Fragmentation," in *NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges*, New York and London, Routledge, 1988, p.83. cited in Winrow op. cit. note 10, p.56.

<sup>164</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.50.

The term “in-area” as opposed to “out-of-area” is defined in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. According to the Article 5, any armed attack against one or more of the allies, or on the forces, vessels or of the aircraft of the parties in or over of the territory defined in the Article 6 would be considered by NATO an attack against all members of the Alliance and necessary measures would be taken to defend the victim. But, what would happen if the interests of the Alliance members were threatened in-out-of area? Was it possible that all the interests of the members were the same? In other words, was it possible that all challenges in-out-of area were threatening for the all members?

Throughout the Cold War, the out-of-area debate tended to concentrate on whether NATO would participate in out-of-area military operations to protect the interests of the Atlantic Alliance members and most likely thwart Soviet ambitions.<sup>165</sup>

The out-of-area issue gained significant importance after the fall of the Shah in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The US administration feared that the Soviet Union could exploit the situation in Iran and disrupt the western oil coming from the Persian Gulf. Hence it announced the establishment of the Rapid Reaction Force without consulting the allies. On the other hand, the European allies, though they were much more dependent on the energy supplies from the Persian Gulf, did not share the fears of the US. They were in favour of keeping the detente and not damaging the trade relations with Moscow.<sup>166</sup>

There was much more unity among the allies with respect to the out-of-area issue when the Iran-Iraq war intensified in the 1980s. At the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, naval forces from the United States, Britain and France coordinated their

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<sup>165</sup> Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid., p. 59.

activities at the operational level in the Indian Ocean in order to keep open the Straits of Hormuz to commercial traffic. Later on Italy and Netherlands participated in these activities. These out-of-area operations were basically preventive military measures. They were coordinated at the operational but were not sanctioned by NATO.<sup>167</sup> NATO member states came to realize that South-South problems, in addition to the perceived Soviet threat, could have a major negative effect on their economic interests.<sup>168</sup> These developments in Afghanistan and in the Persian Gulf had significantly increased NATO's defence considerations in the Mediterranean.

In practice, throughout the Cold War, NATO did not participate in any out-of-area operation. At most, cooperation was limited to coordinated naval activities at the operational level among a handful of allies.<sup>169</sup> By the 1980s the southern Europeans realized that they were more vulnerable to the developments in North Africa and in the Middle East. There was a growing awareness among them that the threats to their security were more likely to come from crisis and conflicts beyond their southern borders than from an East-West confrontation.<sup>170</sup> The northern members of NATO were not so much interested in the developments in the Mediterranean.

## **2.2. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue**

### **2.2.1. Background to NATO's Mediterranean Initiative**

With the end of the Cold War, the focus of European security has shifted from Central Europe to the Southern region.<sup>171</sup> The direct Soviet threat against the Central front has dissolved. More diverse and more indirect threats and challenges on

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<sup>167</sup> Ibid., p.161

<sup>168</sup> Ibid., p. 55.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid., p.64.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., p.56.

<sup>171</sup> W. Bruce Weinrod, "The Southern Region and NATO's Future," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol: 7, No:1, Winter 1996, p.12

European periphery, which were elaborated in the previous chapter, have eclipsed the Russian threat. The events in the Gulf, Algeria and in the Balkans have shown that important alliance interests were in risk. The distinction between European and Mediterranean security has become increasingly blurred as a result of the spillover effect of the problems.<sup>172</sup>

The Ad Hoc Group on the Mediterranean began to discuss the emergence of the new security risks in the Mediterranean as the proliferation of WMD and capabilities of their delivery means, the growth of instability and extremism in North Africa and the conflict in Bosnia.<sup>173</sup>

The Gulf War was a milestone in the evolution of the Mediterranean security. It was not a formal NATO operation, but Alliance planning, procedures and habits of cooperation played an important role in the coalition activity.<sup>174</sup> NATO naval forces and aircraft were alerted to protect air and sea lines of communication in the Mediterranean. Minesweepers were also dispatched to the Mediterranean as it was feared that Iraq and perhaps Libya might attempt to hinder Western access to oil supplies.<sup>175</sup> It was a reminder that the southern hemisphere was not only suffering from serious economic and social problems, but was also subject to a number of disputes over regional hegemony and an associated trend to over-armament issues that can not fail to concern the European and Western powers.<sup>176</sup> In particular, the Iraqi crisis highlighted the issue of WMD and the capacity of their delivery at longer

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<sup>172</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, op. cit. note 6, introduction.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid., p.45.

<sup>174</sup> See Jonathan T. Hovve, "NATO and the Gulf Crisis," *Survival*, Vol:33, No: 3, May-June 1991

<sup>175</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.123.

<sup>176</sup> Alvaro Vasconcelos, "The New Europe and the western Mediterranean," *NATO Review*, Vol:39, No:5, October1991, p.27.

ranges.<sup>177</sup> Iraq fired more than 70 *Scud* missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia although they were only tipped with conventional warheads.<sup>178</sup>

Popular demonstrations in support of Saddam Hussein, an aggressor, and against the West throughout North Africa and in the Middle East was also a cause of concern for the West. Because of support of some of the allies was vital for the success of the coalition forces. The Gulf War underlined the importance of the Mediterranean for power projection. Any problem among the allies would severely complicate the planning for the operation. Overall, the Gulf Crisis made clear that European security and the future of NATO would be more deeply affected by developments outside of the traditional NATO area.<sup>179</sup>

Bosnia has had the effect of enlarging, at least in a de facto sense, the NATO area of responsibility, as well as the field of actors in crisis management.<sup>180</sup> NATO as an organization involved in a number of out-of-area roles in Bosnia. In line with a decision taken by NATO ambassadors in September 1992, individual allies provided troops to protect and escort humanitarian aid convoys in the region under UN command. NATO proposed to support peacekeeping operations under the mandate of the UN Security Council and NATO units and resources were used to support the headquarters of the UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR). NATO vessels enforced UN maritime embargo on the former Yugoslavia. NATO aircraft enforced a UN ban on unauthorized flights over Bosnia, conducted limited air strikes to protect UNPROFOR and to maintain military exclusion zones. NATO units also helped to enforce a ceasefire around Sarajevo and in central Bosnia. In short, in the former Yugoslavia, NATO forces participated in various out-of-area missions –in

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<sup>177</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, op cit. note 12, introduction.

<sup>178</sup> A news program in CNN-TURK on 25 February 25, 2001.

<sup>179</sup> Lesser, op. cit. note 94, p.31.

<sup>180</sup> Lesser, op. cit note 8, p.13.

peacemaking, sanctions enforcing and cease-fire enforcement tasks. Later on, NATO troops with the units from Egypt, Jordan and Morocco participated in the multilateral peacekeeping forces known as IFOR and SFOR.<sup>181</sup>

Cooperation between NATO and non-NATO member Mediterranean countries in peacekeeping missions was a positive development. However there was a great criticism, particularly from the Islamic media and militant Islamic groups because of the late response of the Western community to the Balkan crisis in comparison to the rapid defeat of the Iraqi forces. It was pointed out that in the Bosnian case there was no oil and the principal victims were Muslims, not Christians.<sup>182</sup> Such claims have exacerbated the bad image of NATO in the South and enabled the Islamic groups to boost their popularity at home.

In line with a trend that has been increasingly evident since early 1980s, the NATO London Declaration of 1990 emphasized the non-military dimension of security. In the second paragraph it was stated that “We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance as promised by Article 2 of our treaty.”<sup>183</sup>

At the end of the November 1990, just before the Gulf War, NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner, in a speech noted the emergence of an arc of tension from Maghreb to the Middle East. He also mentioned about the proliferation issue and the problems that Saddam like dictators could cause. Rapid population growth, resource conflicts, migration, economic underdevelopment, the spread of religious

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<sup>181</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.124.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid., p.123.

<sup>183</sup> London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London, 5-6 July 1990, paragraph 25.

fundamentalism and terrorism were also emphasized in his speech as causes for tension.<sup>184</sup>

After the Gulf War, in June 1990, NATO foreign ministers declared that “The Alliance must be prepared to address other unpredictable developments that are beyond the focus of traditional alliance concerns, but that can have direct implications for our security.”<sup>185</sup>

In November 1991, at the Rome Summit, the new Strategic Concept emphasized the broad approach to security. In paragraph 8, new security risks were defined as, in contrast to the predominant threat of the past, multifaceted and multidirectional. It was stated that security and stability had political, economic, social and environmental dimension as well as military dimension (paragraph 24). In paragraph 9 it was stated that serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes could threaten the allies’ interests. Alliance security interests could also be affected by other risks, including proliferation of WMD, disruption of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage (paragraph 12). The enlarged concept of security would give NATO more freedom of maneuver to engage in dialogue with other states.<sup>186</sup> The importance of crisis management and preventive diplomacy was also emphasized (paragraph 31). There were also some statements with respect to importance of dialogue. Even though the Strategic Concept referred extensively to challenges and risks that may stem from Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Gulf were also mentioned. In this regard, the Alliance’s desire for cooperation and the close link between the stability and security of the region and

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<sup>184</sup> Address given by Manfred Wörner, Secretary-General of NATO, to the 38<sup>th</sup> Annual Session of the NAA, London, November 1990, in “Change and Continuity in the Atlantic Alliance”

<sup>185</sup> Final Communiqué of Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, Copenhagen, June 6-7, 1991, paragraph 10.

<sup>186</sup> Winrow, *op cit.* note 10, p.129.



the Alliance were underlined. In particular, the Alliance's concern about the WMD and their delivery means and the overarmament in the region were underpinned (paragraph 11).

In a speech, in June 1992, Wörner stated that with the demise of the Soviet Union, the debate over the out-of-area lost its significance and it was more easy for NATO to be active in out-of-area.<sup>187</sup>

In 1992, the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), which has major influence on NATO officials and their interests in the Mediterranean, published a report. In this report it was stated that NATO should discuss how it could act out of area rather than whether it should act or not. It was also underpinned that the Alliance's interests were important as much as the defence of the territory of its members. In this regard, the report stressed that NATO should never let any disruption of energy supplies and should prevent states from acquiring WMD.<sup>188</sup>

The Final Communique of the NAC meeting in Athens in June 1993 was the first official NATO document stressing that security of Europe was closely related to the security of the Mediterranean and that dialogue and cooperation was necessary for the stability of the region.<sup>189</sup> However a need for a NATO-Mediterranean dialogue was not mentioned specifically.

The NAC communique published in December, just before the Brussels Summit, did not mention the Mediterranean. The Brussels Summit Declaration, particularly because of the lobbying of Italy and Spain referred to the Mediterranean. In paragraph 22, the close relation between the security in Europe and the Mediterranean and the member states pleasure for the developments in the Middle

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<sup>187</sup> Speech by the Secretary-General of NATO, Manfred Wörner, at the 1992 Sea Link Symposium, Annapolis, Maryland, June 18, 1992.

<sup>188</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.128.

East peace process were emphasized. It was also stated that the breakthrough had also opened the way for dialogue, understanding and confidence building in the region. The Council in Permanent Session was directed to review the overall situation. The paragraph ended with underlining NATO's support for the efforts for the stability of the region.<sup>190</sup>

The Final Communiqué released after the NAC meeting in Istanbul, in June 1994 stated that political developments around the Mediterranean were considered carefully. The Council in Permanent Session was directed to examine how NATO could contribute to regional stability.<sup>191</sup> At the moment, the situation in North Africa, particularly in Algeria and the proliferation issue were the main concerns.<sup>192</sup>

Mediterranean security was one of the topics discussed by the NATO defence ministers at the informal meeting in Seville on 29-30 September 1994. At this meeting French and US officials, who had hesitations until then, made more explicit statements in favor of NATO involvement in the Mediterranean.<sup>193</sup> In this meeting necessary consensus to launch a dialogue with non-member Mediterranean countries was reached among the allies. Then the question was which country should be invited.

The Final Communiqué issued at the ministerial meeting of the NAC in December 1994 stated that NATO was ready to establish contacts on case by case basis with the Mediterranean non-member countries to contribute to the stability of the region. The Council in Permanent Session was directed to continue to review the

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<sup>189</sup> Final Communiqué issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, Athens, June 10, 1993, paragraph 14.

<sup>190</sup> Declaration of the Heads of the State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the NAC, Brussels, January 10-11, 1994, paragraph 22.

<sup>191</sup> Final Communiqué issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, Istanbul, June 9, 1994, paragraph 29.

<sup>192</sup> Winrow, *op cit.* note 10, p.156.

situation, to develop the details of the proposed dialogue and to initiate appropriate preliminary contacts.<sup>194</sup> Finally, NATO announced the beginning of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue on February 8, 1995.

### **2.2.2. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue**

As a result of the consensus among the member states five countries were invited to the dialogue. These states were Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Before the invitation NATO officials had been ensured that their offer would not be rejected. Initially NATO officials planned to invite only three countries which were Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. But, because of its geostrategic importance for Portugal and Spain, even though it was not a Mediterranean country, Mauritania was also included. Israel was also invited due to the US administration's insistence.

In the initial round of the Mediterranean Dialogue, Jordan, even though it fulfilled the ad hoc criteria and it had great interest, was excluded because of its support for Iraq during the 1991-1992 Gulf Crisis.<sup>195</sup> It joined the dialogue in November 1995.

The dialogue countries differ in the nature of their political systems and in the conditions of their economies. There are certain tensions between the Arab countries and Israel. However, they fulfil certain criteria to be partner for the dialogue. Each of them had reasonable stable government, unlike for example Algeria. The leadership of each of the states had some claim to legitimacy. Each of them is, in general pro-

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<sup>193</sup> NAA Report, Political Committee, Sub-Committee on the Southern Region, Cooperation and Security in the Mediterranean, AL 223 PC/SR (94) 2 by Rodrigo de Rato, Brussels, November 1994, p.16.

<sup>194</sup> Final Communiqué issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, Brussels, December 1, 1994, paragraph 19.

<sup>195</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.170.

western and each of them had normalized their relations with each other, including Israel.<sup>196</sup>

As it was declared at the very beginning of the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue, it was open to other non-member Mediterranean countries. This policy was also emphasized in the NAC Ministerial Meeting at the end of the May 1995. It was announced that further discussions with these and other Mediterranean countries would lead to the establishment of a fruitful dialogue.<sup>197</sup> However, NATO officials are in favor of keeping the number limited. Because it is widely believed in that small number is relatively more manageable.

For the reasons mentioned above Libya, Syria and Lebanon have not been invited to participate in the dialogue and it is highly unlikely that they will be invited without a change in leadership and a dramatic turnout in their foreign policies.<sup>198</sup>

The dialogue is not a reaction to a particular event or a threat, but rather is a part of NATO's overall cooperative approach to security.<sup>199</sup> The main purpose of the dialogue is to contribute security and stability in the Mediterranean, achieving a better mutual understanding and correcting any misperceptions between NATO and the Mediterranean partner countries by building confidence through greater transparency, discussion and cooperation.<sup>200</sup>

The dialogue is progressive in nature. This has allowed the content of the dialogue to evolve.<sup>201</sup> It is bilateral in structure. This principle has proved extremely important for the Mediterranean partners. Israel and the Arab states in question don't

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<sup>196</sup> Ibid, p.169.

<sup>197</sup> Press Release (95) 12 –February 8,1995- Statement by the NATO Spokesman on NATO's Mediterranean Initiative.

<sup>198</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.171.

<sup>199</sup> Alberto Bin, "Strengthening Cooperation in the Mediterranean: NATO's Contribution," *NATO Review*, Vol:46, No:4, Winter 1998, p.25.

<sup>200</sup> Jette Nordam, "The Mediterranean Dialogue: Dispelling Misconceptions and Building Confidence," *NATO Review*, Vol:45, No:4, July-August 1997, p.28.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid.

want to be seen as a definite group.<sup>202</sup> They wish to conduct the dialogue as individual sovereign states. This has consequently made the dialogue less vulnerable to disruption due to political developments ongoing elsewhere in the region. Despite the predominantly bilateral character, the dialogue allows for multilateral meetings on a case-by-case basis.<sup>203</sup>

All the Mediterranean partners are offered the same basis for cooperative activities and discussion with NATO. What is offered to one dialogue partner is offered to all the others in the dialogue. However, within this non-discriminatory framework, partners are free to choose the extent and intensity of their participation.<sup>204</sup> As it was stated by the Secretary-General Javier Solana the initiative is a dialogue of “variable geometry.”<sup>205</sup> The dialogue countries are also free to participate or not in various cooperative activities.<sup>206</sup>

The Mediterranean dialogue consists of political dialogue and participation in specific activities. The political dialogue consists of regular bilateral political discussions with the possibility of additional meetings or briefings on a case-by-case basis. These discussions provide an opportunity for extensive briefings on NATO activities, including its programs of external outreach and partnership, its internal adaptation and its general approach to building cooperative security structures. In turn, Mediterranean partners are invited to share their views with NATO on stability and security in the Mediterranean region.<sup>207</sup>

Until the establishment of the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG) in July 1997, the Alliance’s Political Committee had the overall responsibility for the

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<sup>202</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p. 176.

<sup>203</sup> Nordam, op cit note 200, p.28.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid., pp. 27-28.

<sup>205</sup> Secretary-General’s Remarks at the Conference on the Mediterranean Dialogue and the New NATO, Valencia, February 25, 1999.

<sup>206</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.182.

<sup>207</sup> NATO Basic Fact Sheet, No:16, May 1997, The Mediterranean Dialogue, p.3.

dialogue. Talks were held at NATO headquarters on bilateral basis between officials from the Political Affairs Division of NATO's International Staff and representatives from the embassies in Brussels of the Mediterranean dialogue countries.<sup>208</sup>

The dialogue started with a number of invitations made by Secretary-General Willy Claes. Starting on February 24, Claes began to receive the ambassadors of the Mediterranean dialogue countries based in Brussels.<sup>209</sup> The first meeting between NATO's International Staff and one of the dialogue countries, Mauritania in this case, was held on May 1995. In the spring and summer of 1995 two rounds of bilateral talks were concluded between NATO's International Staff and four of the dialogue countries. Morocco, protesting Willy Claes' unfortunate statements with respect to Islam, had not participated in any talks during that period.<sup>210</sup>

The first talks were simply exploratory in nature. NATO officials explained the nature and purpose of the Alliance in addition to the its new missions of peacekeeping and sounded out the concerns of the dialogue countries.<sup>211</sup> At this phase, there was no intention of multilateralizing of the talks because of the reasons mentioned above.

As it was stated in the Final Communiqué of the NAC meeting in Brussels, in December 1995, NATO member states were satisfied with the talks held in that year. However, at the same time they were aware of the fact that the dialogue had not been fully established and they emphasized the need to explore the possibilities for a permanent dialogue.<sup>212</sup>

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<sup>208</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, pp.172-173.

<sup>209</sup> NAA, Political Committee, Sub-Committee on the Southern Region, Draft Interim Report, AM 106 PC/SR (95) 1 by Rodrigo de Rato, Brussels, May 1995, p.7.

<sup>210</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.174.

<sup>211</sup> Final Communiqué issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, Noordwijk, May 30, 1995, paragraph 11.

<sup>212</sup> Final Communiqué issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, Brussels, December 5, 1995, paragraph 12.

Later on, the talks had been based on much more established footing. Discussions continued on the basis of two rounds of talks each year between NATO's International Staff and each of the dialogue countries. Talks were no longer merely exploratory. Political, economic and social developments in the Mediterranean and prospects for regional cooperation were the new topics.<sup>213</sup>

In June 1996 multilateralization was introduced. But this was not discussions and debates with the six Mediterranean dialogue countries. Dialogue within the dialogue strictly remained bilateral. Both NATO officials and the representatives of the dialogue countries favored this arrangement. Only briefings were referred to here. In June and December 1996 the dialogue countries were invited as a group briefings related to the recently concluded meetings of the NAC. In September they attended a briefing on civil-emergency planning.<sup>214</sup>

The establishment of the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG) in July 1997 was a significant step in the progressive dialogue. The Final Communiqué released at the ministerial meeting of the NAC in Sintra, in May 1997 stated that the Alliance wanted to further enhance the dialogue and improve its overall political visibility as an effort of confidence building and cooperation.<sup>215</sup> This was the first time an official NATO text referred to the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue in terms of "confidence building."<sup>216</sup> In that meeting a decision was taken to recommend to the Heads of State and Government to formally establish a committee having the overall responsibility for the Mediterranean dialogue. As a result of this, in the Madrid Meeting, in July 1997, the Heads of State and Government decided to

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<sup>213</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.176.

<sup>214</sup> Ibid.

<sup>215</sup> Final Communiqué issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, Sintra, May 29, 1997, paragraph 6.

<sup>216</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.179.

establish under the authority of the North Atlantic Council a new committee, the Mediterranean Cooperation Group.<sup>217</sup>

The MCG replaced the Ad Hoc Group on the Mediterranean which had aimed at supporting the Mediterranean Dialogue. It has the overall responsibility for the dialogue as well as conducting the political discussions with individual partners. The MCG consists of political advisers from each of the nineteen national delegations. It meets as group of nineteen to discuss policy and other matters of direct relevance to the dialogue. However, it is possible that ‘reinforced’ meetings with representatives from the capitals of the NATO members can be held. The chairperson of NATO’s Political Committee can also chair the MCG. The MCG gathers to meet separately once a year with the representatives of the dialogue countries in a “19+1” format. If necessary additional “19+1” meetings can also be convened.<sup>218</sup> The first discussions between the allies and the individual participant countries took place on November 20-21, 1997.<sup>219</sup>

The creation of MCG has added a high degree of visibility to the Alliance’s Mediterranean dimension.<sup>220</sup> Mediterranean issues would become a permanent item on the agenda of the Political Committee. Unlike the previous Ad Hoc Group on the Mediterranean, the MCG could make recommendations to the Political Committee and by extension to the NAC. Dialogue countries were no longer restricted to contacts with the NATO officials whose room for manoeuvre was limited, but were direct touch with representatives from the national delegations at NATO headquarters in Brussels.<sup>221</sup>

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<sup>217</sup> Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the NAC, Madrid, July 8, 1997, paragraph 13.

<sup>218</sup> Nordam, op cit note, p.28

<sup>219</sup> Bin, op. cit. note 199, p.25

<sup>220</sup> Ibid., p.19.

<sup>221</sup> NAA, Mediterranean Special Group, Draft General Report, NATO’s Role in the Mediterranean, AP 245 GSM (97) 9 by Pedro Moya, Brussels, August 1997, pp. 8-12.



In practice, in spite of the foundation of the MCG, the issues discussed between NATO officials and the representatives of the dialogue countries were almost the same as the ones before the creation of the MCG. Sensitive issues, such as the proliferation of WMD, were avoided. It seems very difficult to tackle with the proliferation issue despite the common interest of all the participants of the Mediterranean Dialogue. The principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance is to prevent proliferation from occurring or should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means.<sup>222</sup> But, even though the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles should be among the central issues for discussion in the dialogue, it is avoided because of the great cleavage between the Alliance and the Arab World. WMD issue, for the Arab Dialogue states, particularly for Egypt, is seen through the lenses of the strategic competition with Israel. The Alliance concern focuses on the Arab World's program while not mentioning about the Israel's arsenal. Many states in the dialogue view this as an evidence of a double standard.<sup>223</sup> The Arab World feels that it is the North that poses threat to the South not vice versa.<sup>224</sup> NATO officials don't want to risk the dialogue, at least at the moment, by discussing the issue.

Following the foundation of the MCG more emphasis and importance was placed on the cooperative activities between NATO and the dialogue countries. There were some activities before the establishment of the MCG in the field of information and science. Such as, with regard to information, the key component of the initiative facilitating mutual understanding, NATO had established contacts with the opinion leaders from the dialogue countries in order to explain the aims and objectives of the Alliance. In October and November 1996, two conferences were

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<sup>222</sup> Solana, op. cit. note 11, p.41

<sup>223</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, op cit. note 12, p.27.

held in Rome devoted to security issues in the Mediterranean to which academics from the dialogue countries were invited. In November 1996 opinion leaders from these countries were received at NATO headquarters in Brussels.<sup>225</sup>

In the field of science, in November 1995, the dialogue countries were requested to nominate certain “contact points” to receive and disseminate information related to NATO’s scientific activities. In the same month NATO announced that the dialogue countries could send their scientists on a self-funded bases to the scientific meetings organized by the Science Committee.<sup>226</sup> The visit of the Defense College Commandant to the defense colleges in Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Tunisia in 1996 to plan a curriculum and to explore the areas of possible cooperation was the only military related activities.

With the establishment of the MCG the number and scope of the activities have increased. By the end of the 1997, the first annual program between NATO and the dialogue countries had been prepared. These programs included activities in information, civil emergency planning (CEP), science and defense related areas.<sup>227</sup>

In the field of information, in October 1997, for the first time, parliamentarians from the six dialogue countries visited NATO headquarters and met Secretary-General Solana.<sup>228</sup> In November 1997, NATO helped sponsor two academic conferences in Rome that analyzed Mediterranean security issues. In December 1997 another international seminar on security issues in the Mediterranean was convened in Ebenhausen, Germany, with NATO support.<sup>229</sup>

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<sup>224</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.130

<sup>225</sup> Ibid., pp. 176-177.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid. p.177.

<sup>227</sup> Bin, op. cit. note 199, p.25.

<sup>228</sup> Speech by NATO Secretary-General Solana, at the Centre Militaredi Studi Strategici/RAND International Conference on the *Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative*, Rome, November 10, 1997.

<sup>229</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.180.

In June, the dialogue countries participated in a seminar on “The Vulnerability of Food and Agriculture in Emergencies and Natural Disasters” organized by NATO in Vienna.<sup>230</sup> In addition, NATO together with the Greek authorities sponsored a seminar designed specifically for the Mediterranean dialogue countries in November 1998 on “Natural Disaster Reduction in the Mediterranean Basin.” The seminar brought together heads of CEP agencies from NATO and the dialogue countries for the first time.<sup>231</sup> In October 1998, journalists –for the first time-, academicians and parliamentarians from the dialogue countries were invited to Brussels for briefings on the Mediterranean Initiative.<sup>232</sup>

In 1998, NATO also awarded its first Institutional Fellowships which aimed to promote study and research in areas of particular interest to the organisation, primarily alliance security and political issues, to scholars from the dialogue countries. Five fellowships were awarded to scholars from Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania and Morocco.<sup>233</sup> Later on, three more fellowships have been awarded to the dialogue countries: One to Israel and two to Morocco.<sup>234</sup>

In the Valencia Conference on “The Mediterranean Dialogue and the new NATO” in February 1999, for the first time NATO ambassadors and the representatives from the dialogue countries came together to discuss jointly the way ahead for the Mediterranean Dialogue.<sup>235</sup>

The establishment of the “Contact Point Embassies” in the dialogue countries was an important step in the effort to exchange information. In May 1998, NATO

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<sup>230</sup> NATO Press Release 98 (75) –June 10, 1998- EAPC Seminar on the Vulnerability of Food and Agriculture in Emergencies and Natural Disasters.

<sup>231</sup> Bin, op. cit. note 199, p.25.

<sup>232</sup> Ibid.

<sup>233</sup> NATO Press Release 98 (67) –May 29, 1998- NATO-EAPC Research Fellowships Program 1998-2000.

<sup>234</sup> NATO Press Release 2000 (066) –June 13, 2000- NATO-EAPC Research Fellowships Program 2000-2002.

officials decided to establish contact points in the embassy of a NATO member state in each of the capitals of the dialogue countries. These contact points would be source of information on NATO activities for the general public in the dialogue countries.<sup>236</sup>

In the field of science, in 1998 funds enabled the dialogue country scientists to participate in NATO sponsored Advanced Research Workshops, Advanced Study Institutes, Collaborate Research Grants and Science Fellowships.<sup>237</sup> The Mediterranean dialogue countries can receive and disseminate information on NATO's scientific activities and participate in meetings conducted under the auspices of NATO Science Committee, including symposia and other special activities.<sup>238</sup> For example, in November 2000 they participated in the "6<sup>th</sup> NATO Blood Conference" to discuss the issues concerning the future status of blood availability and utilisation in civil and military emergencies.<sup>239</sup>

After the Madrid declaration some cooperative activities in the military domain have also started. Potentially there was much expertise that NATO could offer to the dialogue countries. Between September and December 1997 courses on peacekeeping, military forces and environmental problems, European security cooperation and civil-military cooperation for civil emergency management were open to the dialogue countries at the NATO School in Oberammergau. In the same period a number of seminars, conferences, symposia and visits were organized by the NATO Military Committee to inform the officers from the dialogue countries on the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programs, maritime peace support operations, air

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<sup>235</sup> NATO Press Release 99 (22) –February 24, 1999- Conference in Valencia on the Mediterranean Dialogue and the new NATO.

<sup>236</sup> Bin, op. cit. note 199, pp.25-26.

<sup>237</sup> Ibid.

<sup>238</sup> Nordam, op cit note 200, p.28.

<sup>239</sup> NATO Press Release 2000 (099) –November 8, 2000- 6<sup>th</sup> NATO Blood Conference.

operations and humanitarian aid, maritime safety, mine warfare and maritime counter-terrorism. Course held at Oberammergau in 1998 included conventional arms control implementation.<sup>240</sup>

In April 1998, the first NATO Defence College course was opened particularly for the dialogue countries. The partner countries, with the exception of Morocco that sent only an observer from the Moroccan embassy in Rome, sent senior military officers or civilian officials. The aim of the course was to enhance mutual understanding of each others' security concerns, promote an understanding of NATO's interest and capabilities in the region and offer opportunities for professional and personal network among the participants.<sup>241</sup> The course focused on current Alliance issues, NATO's role in European security cooperation and NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue.<sup>242</sup>

In 1998, military officers from the dialogue countries agreed to observe PfP activities in the fields of search and rescue, maritime safety and medical evacuation and exercises related to peace support and humanitarian relief. However, joint military exercises in the foreseeable future are not expected.<sup>243</sup>

### **2.2.3. The Mediterranean Dialogue and the New Strategic Concept**

NATO's new Strategic Concept updates the previous Strategic Concept adopted in Rome, in 1991. It takes into account the new security environment in the post-Cold War era. It referred specifically to the Mediterranean Initiative in paragraphs 38 and 50. In paragraph 38 it was stressed that security in Europe was closely related to security in the Mediterranean and that NATO's Mediterranean

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<sup>240</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.181.

<sup>241</sup> NATO Press Release 98 (44) –April 20, 1998- First Course for the Mediterranean Dialogue Partners at the Defense College

<sup>242</sup> Bin, op. cit. note 199, p.26.

Dialogue was an integral part of NATO's cooperative approach to security. Paragraph 50 emphasizes the value of military-to-military contacts to deepen NATO's relationships with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries.

The new Strategic Concept has other implications for the Mediterranean and for the Mediterranean Initiative. It emphasises that risks are multi-dimensional and difficult to predict. It puts emphasis on the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD. The geographic scope of the risks has expanded. They are expected from the periphery of the Alliance. Extensive reference is made to crisis management. The importance of peace support operations and crisis response operations are underlined. In this regard, the necessity of enhanced power projection capabilities of the allies and the alliance is also stressed. There is no reference for a need of a UN mandate for a possible NATO action in a crisis, which opens the way for Kosovo like operations in the future. In Kosovo, the Alliance acted without a UN mandate.<sup>244</sup>

#### **2.2.4. The Perspectives of Member States**

There isn't full consensus among the allies. European members of NATO see no real hard security threat from or in the South.<sup>245</sup> For European policy-makers Western Mediterranean, particularly Maghreb, is utmost important.<sup>246</sup> The US, disagreeing with European counterparts, is concerned about hard security threats in the region.<sup>247</sup> Senior US policy-makers think first and foremost Eastern Mediterranean. They also see the Mediterranean as a stepping stone for the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. However, the Bosnian crisis has shown how a crisis on the periphery could spill over and affect important alliance interests as well as how

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<sup>243</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.181.

<sup>244</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, op cit. note 12, p.21.

<sup>245</sup> Yaphe, p.21.

<sup>246</sup> Asmus, Larabee and Lesser, op. cit. note 5, p.27.

difficult it was for the US to remain aloof from a conflict in which the interests of its key allies are involved. Similarly it would be difficult for the US to ignore North Africa.<sup>248</sup>

In the early 1990s, the US was reluctant to support any cooperative initiative in the Mediterranean that might endanger the Middle East Peace Process and threaten the presence of the Sixth Fleet. This reluctance had disappeared by 1995. Dialogue with the Mediterranean was good for the US provided it did not distract NATO states from strengthening ties with Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>249</sup> The US regards the dialogue as a contribution to European and Middle Eastern security.<sup>250</sup>

With the end of the Cold War the southern European states felt marginalized within the Alliance because of the great attention given to Central and Eastern Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union by the US, Canada and North European allies. Hence, in addition to the security challenges stemming from the region, southern member states, particularly Spain, backed by Italy and Portugal, lobbied for the NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue. Spain officials had also lobbied for the creation of MCG.

Spain, Portugal and Italy proposed to create PfP-type arrangement for the Mediterranean, including military exercises. The other allies did not welcome this proposal. Because, such an arrangement could divert the resources from the East.<sup>251</sup> There is a feeling among most of the NATO states that the Mediterranean should not appear to be elevated to the same level of importance as NATO's relations with Central and Eastern Europe and with Russia. Indeed the dialogue countries were not as enthusiastic as the East for a PfP type arrangement.

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<sup>247</sup> Yaphe, p.61.

<sup>248</sup> Asmus, Larabee and Lesser, op. cit. note 5, p.27.

<sup>249</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.186.

<sup>250</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, op cit. note 12, p.4.

France, in spite of its traditional interest in the Mediterranean is reluctant to see more involvement of NATO in the region. French officials fear that the dialogue might harm its relations with North African countries. Hence, they believe in that, more than the other European countries, the EU is better positioned to play the lead role in the Mediterranean.

Greece did not oppose to the dialogue. Athens traditionally enjoyed close relations with the Arab World. For Greece its perceptions with respect to Turkey is the most important security subject.

Turkey which has some historical and cultural ties with some of the dialogue countries supports the dialogue. In October 1999, Turkey announced that the dialogue countries could participate in the courses opened in the PfP Center, Ankara, which will be organized in the period of 2001-2003.

Canada and the North European members of the Alliance are less enthusiastic about the Mediterranean Initiative. They did not oppose to the dialogue when they were assured that it would be cost free, would remain at the diplomatic level and would not divert NATO's attention from Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>252</sup>

#### **2.2.5. The Perspectives of the Mediterranean Dialogue Countries**

NATO has a negative image in the South. The southern Mediterranean states' ties with the West have historically been characterized by distrust, conflict and betrayal.<sup>253</sup> With the exception of Israel, these countries endured years of western colonialism. NATO was established within the framework of Cold War and was widely perceived as a military instrument of the West to suppress national liberation movements. The widely held belief in the Arab World that NATO was

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<sup>251</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, op. cit. note 6, p.51.



supporting France against Algerians during the war of independence (1954-1962) reinforced this image.<sup>254</sup> The US support for Israel and NATO as a US dominated organisation was another factor for the bad image.<sup>255</sup>

The southern Mediterranean countries do not welcome the western feeling of religious, cultural and political superiority. They believe that the West sees the region only as a place to be exploited, defended against or ignored. Indeed to some in the region, NATO and the West are the main security threat.<sup>256</sup>

After the end of the Cold War these negative perceptions have persisted. During the Cold War NATO was known as a bulwark against the Soviet expansionism. But the Soviet Union has disappeared from the scene. Then what was NATO seeking?<sup>257</sup> NATO's expansion of membership was viewed as an attempt to reinforce Western strategic global control.<sup>258</sup>

The huge arms machine, mostly consisting of NATO powers, which was decisively used in the Gulf War, against a Muslim country, was a real concern for the Arab World. The passive role of NATO in the early stages of the Bosnian conflict (1991-1994), where NATO failed to protect Bosnian Muslims from atrocities committed against them by the Serbs was another serious concern.<sup>259</sup> NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes' unfortunate statement in February 1995 that Islamic Fundamentalism had emerged as perhaps the greatest threat to western security since the collapse of communism has tended to reinforce such impressions.<sup>260</sup>

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<sup>252</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.154.

<sup>253</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, op. cit. note 6, p.60.

<sup>254</sup> Mohammed El-Sayed Selim, "Southern Mediterranean Perception of Security Cooperation and the Role of NATO," in *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, ed. by Hans Günter Brauch, Antonio Marquina and Abdelwahab Biad, London, Macmillan, 2000, p.140.

<sup>255</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.66.

<sup>256</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, op cit. note 12, pp. 60-61.

<sup>257</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, op. cit. note 6, p.61

<sup>258</sup> Selim, op. cit. note 254, p.140

<sup>259</sup> Ibid., p.141.

<sup>260</sup> "NATO Chief Under Fire for Islamic Remarks," *International Herald Tribune*, February 15, 1995.

NATO policy in Kosovo has been more positively perceived in the South. In Kosovo, NATO forces carried out air operations against the Serbian targets without a UN mandate to bring the Serbs to the table. However, the Arab World was apprehensive for the potential for western intervention elsewhere.<sup>261</sup>

In general none of the dialogue countries has opposed to the initiative and each of them regarded it with a variety degree of interest. But they complain about that they don't know the aims and the objectives of the dialogue and its ultimate goal.<sup>262</sup> They concern about the composition of the group. Why each was chosen to participate in the dialogue and why others were excluded? Any relation with Israel by a group of Arab states while other Arab States were excluded is seen as a breach in Arab solidarity.<sup>263</sup> They don't want to be considered as partners with Israel.<sup>264</sup> And why ask the Arab dialogue countries, is the dialogue not more transparent? The Arab dialogue countries also question to what extent NATO speaks with one voice. Are countries like Italy, Portugal and Spain really concerned about the Mediterranean or are they merely seeking to exploit the Mediterranean security issues in order to bolster their own position in NATO and in the EU?<sup>265</sup>

Many dialogue countries feel that NATO is essentially seeking a way to keep the North African states and their problems at arm's length rather than genuinely trying to engage with them.<sup>266</sup> They are well aware of the money spent to the NATO's east in stark contrast to the Mediterranean Initiative in which almost all the activities are based on self-funding.<sup>267</sup>

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<sup>261</sup> Lesser, op cit note 8, p.16.

<sup>262</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.187.

<sup>263</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, op. cit. note 6, pp.57-58.

<sup>264</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.167.

<sup>265</sup> Ibid.

<sup>266</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, op. cit. note 6, p.59.

<sup>267</sup> Ibid.

NATO represents not only a strategic organisation, but also a collection of wealthy western states. Thus involvement in the dialogue is seen as an opportunity to improve ties, as well as economic relations, with these countries. In other words, the dialogue is perceived as a way to establish closer relations with the EU.<sup>268</sup>

Egypt and Jordan were the most active participants among the Arab states. They were in favor of more practical cooperation. The Egyptians are keen to cooperate with NATO in the scientific field, specifically with regard to tackling desertification. Coordinating work with NATO in the area of counter-terrorism also attracted Egypt.<sup>269</sup> Egyptian officials are also requesting assistance of NATO helping to demine large stretches of territory around El Alamein. But NATO officials regard the demining issue as merely of economic rather than crucial humanitarian subject.<sup>270</sup>

Jordan traditionally enjoyed close relations with the West. The initiative was a new opportunity in this regard. There wasn't much public criticism with respect to the dialogue. The Jordanians want to particularly cooperate with NATO in the fields of countering drug smuggling, anti-terrorism and prevention of man made disasters. They lobbied for the inclusion of the Gulf countries, which was not welcomed by the NATO officials.<sup>271</sup>

At the start of the dialogue the Moroccans were very suspicious about the intentions of the dialogue. For Morocco, national security revolves first and foremost around the ability to satisfy the needs of the Moroccan people, which include, transportation, housing, nutrition, health, electrification, civil and criminal justice.

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<sup>268</sup> Ibid., p.64

<sup>269</sup> Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.189.

<sup>270</sup> Ibid., p.191

<sup>271</sup> Ibid.

These are needs that NATO is not particularly well suited to address. However, it enjoys the dialogue because it is a way to improve relations with the North.<sup>272</sup>

Even though Tunisia shares the scepticism of the Moroccans, it is quite happy to participate in any European sponsored dialogue. It is the leading dialogue country in North Africa.<sup>273</sup> The Tunisians have called for a dialogue based on real cooperation rather than simply conducting dialogue for the sake of the dialogue.<sup>274</sup>

Mauritania is the poorest and most economically and socially backward of the dialogue countries. It is apprehensive of its powerful northern neighbour, Morocco. The Mauritanian authorities believe in that participating in the dialogue together with Morocco will ease their security concerns.<sup>275</sup>

Algeria, which participated in the dialogue in March 2000, has expressed its satisfaction. Fight against terrorism and organised crime is one of the issues that Algeria wants to cooperate with NATO.<sup>276</sup>

Israel is quite pleased to be included in the initiative. Because the other dialogue countries are Arab and this dialogue is something like a symbol of Israel's regional acceptance. Indeed it does not need such a dialogue. It is interested in cooperating with NATO in areas such as civil emergency and counter terrorism.<sup>277</sup> Israeli officials, sensitive to the suspicions and concerns of the Arab participants, are not likely to assume much more active role in the dialogue, even though variable geometry is applied.<sup>278</sup>

The new Strategic Concept, the expanded definition of NATO's geographic scope and the emphasis on non-Article 5 operations, NATO's willingness to act in

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<sup>272</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, *op. cit.* note 6, p.59

<sup>273</sup> *Ibid.*, p.70.

<sup>274</sup> Winrow, *op cit.* note 10, p.190.

<sup>275</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>276</sup> NAA, Mediterranean Special Group, the Sixth Mediterranean Dialogue Seminar, Report, AT 329 GSM (00) 10, International Secretariat, Brussels, January 2001, p.3.

<sup>277</sup> Winrow, *op cit.* note 10, p.230.

some cases without a UN mandate and its emphasis on the need to enhance its power projection capabilities could intensify the concerns in the Middle East and North Africa about NATO's purposes and objectives, stimulating fears that NATO is now more likely to intervene in the region.<sup>279</sup>

Both sides of the Mediterranean are fully aware that many of the prevailing problems in the region are of an economic and social, rather than military, nature. The Alliance has no means of eliminating these problems. Nevertheless, it is felt that NATO can contribute to enhance security and stability in the region by dispelling misconceptions about NATO and building confidence through greater transparency, dialogue and cooperation.<sup>280</sup>

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<sup>278</sup> Ibid., p.230.

<sup>279</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, op cit. note 12, pp.21-22.

### CHAPTER 3: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

The Mediterranean region is of strategic importance to the EU. A prosperous, democratic, stable and secure region, with an open prospective towards Europe, is in the best interests of the EU and Europe as whole.<sup>281</sup> But as it was stated by the European Parliament that: the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, the continuing endemic nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the spread of conflict between different nationalities and groupings, and the aggregate effects of growing ecological problems, economic dependence, debt, the continued existence of regimes of various political shades unsympathetic to the developments of democracy and human rights, unemployment, the population explosion and increasing migration have greatly exacerbated the political and social destabilisation of the whole southern and south-eastern Mediterranean.<sup>282</sup>

The challenges faced and even presented by the southern states may not be military in nature, but the force of the non-military threats to their security and internal stability carry both immediate and long term implications for their European neighbours.<sup>283</sup> Hence the EU launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Barcelona process in 1995 to bring together its 15 member states and 12 Mediterranean partners (Algeria, Egypt, Greek Cypriot Government, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority).

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<sup>280</sup> Nordam, op. cit. note 200, p.29.

<sup>281</sup> European Council, "Common Strategy of the European Council of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean Region," 2000/458/CFSP, Santa Maria de Feira, 19 June 2000.

### 3.1. Short Review of the Relations before the Barcelona Process

#### 3.1.1. The Early Agreements in the 1960s

Almost all of the states in the southern and eastern part of the Mediterranean were colonies of the European states, particularly of Britain, France and Italy. After they got their independence in 1950s and in 1960s, even the most nationalist ones, did not give up their relations with colonist powers.<sup>284</sup>

Beginning in the late 1950s, the European Economic Community (EEC) and several non-member Mediterranean countries began dialogue aimed at formalising trade relations between north and the south. Between 1960 and 1972 bilateral trade agreements were signed with Greece, Turkey, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, Spain, Malta, Egypt, Lebanon and Cyprus to solidify the EEC's commercial presence in the South.<sup>285</sup> The agreements signed with Greece and Turkey were different than the others, because they offered eventual Community membership. The other agreements were more limited in nature.

These early agreements were in general a series of responses to the overtures made by the non-member Mediterranean states. As result of this, the non-member states were granted wide range of tariff concessions and quota increases. But the operation of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the 1960s, which was –and still is– a fundamentally protectionist measure designed to shelter European agribusiness by tariffs, price supports, quotas and other measures, limited Mediterranean agricultural exports to the EEC.<sup>286</sup> So, most of the privileges given to the non-member countries included industrial products. But generally the non-member

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<sup>282</sup> European Parliament, "Resolution on the role of Europe in Relation to Security in the Mediterranean, A3-0076/1991.

<sup>283</sup> Claire Spencer, "The Maghreb in the 1990s," Adelphi Paper, 1996, p.3.

<sup>284</sup> Meliha Benli Altunışık, "AB'nin Yeni Akdeniz Politikası ve Türkiye," in *Türkiye ve Avrupa*, ed. by Atila Eralp, Ankara, İmge Kitabevi, 1997, pp. 351-352.

<sup>285</sup> Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, op.cit. note 23, p.49.

Mediterranean countries were not able to manufacture industrial goods that could be exported to the EEC. As a result of this, the bilateral agreements did not have so much positive effect for the region.<sup>287</sup>

### **3.1.2. The Global Mediterranean Policy**

The Rome treaty did not mention neither of a general Mediterranean policy nor of a particular initiatives between the EEC and any of the non-member Mediterranean states. The EEC failed to establish a coherent policy dealing with the Mediterranean region in the 1960s. It was almost impossible for the Community to speak with a single voice in many areas, from financial and technical to the movement of foreign workers to environmental policy.<sup>288</sup>

The Community, well aware of the deficiencies of the early agreements, decided to establish a region wide approach. Particularly France and Italy, the main producers of the agricultural goods in the Community, took the lead. They were anxious about the bilateral trade agreements signed by a individual member state and a non-member Mediterranean state, because such agreements could increase agricultural concessions in favour of the non-member Mediterranean states and against France's and Italy's agribusiness. As a result of this the Commission proposed the establishment of the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) in September 1972. In October 1972, the Heads of States or Government of the Member States meeting in Paris issued a communique that laid out the goals of the new policy. The Council of Ministers officially adopted the GMP in November 1972.

The GMP was the first Mediterranean wide policy. It included four main objectives:

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<sup>286</sup> Ibid., p.55



- 1) Free trade in industrial goods between the EEC and the non-member Mediterranean countries;
- 2) Limited concessions in agricultural goods;
- 3) Technical and financial cooperation;
- 4) Financial aid to the developing countries.<sup>289</sup>

Initially the proposal envisioned free trade in all industrial products between the EEC and the more developed non-member Mediterranean countries, notably Spain, Israel, Malta and Cyprus, by July 1977. Tariff schedules for the other Mediterranean countries, judged to be less developed, would be reduced over 12 to 17 year period. In the area of agriculture, tariffs on 80 percent of non-member Mediterranean countries' farm goods to the Community were targeted for reduction, although at varying rates.<sup>290</sup> In contrast to the pure trade agreements signed during the 1960s, the GMP placed development policy high on its list of goals.<sup>291</sup> In this regard initial cooperation and aid proposals were quite ambitious. The EEC hoped to implement the GMP by December 1973.<sup>292</sup>

But as a result of the break of the Arab-Israeli War in October 1973 which led to an oil embargo against the West, the economies of the non-oil producing countries were thrown into disarray. The unemployment rate increased swiftly. By December 1973, the Council of Ministers abandoned the goal of region-wide negotiation. This was the first retreat from the GMP as it was originally formulated. Instead of concluding a single, consistent agreement with the non-member Mediterranean states

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<sup>287</sup> Altunışık, op. cit. note 284, p.356.

<sup>288</sup> Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, op. cit. note 23, pp.49-72.

<sup>289</sup> Ibid, p.86.

<sup>290</sup> Ibid.

<sup>291</sup> Commission of the European Communities, Report on the Community's Mediterranean Policy (1975-1988), Working Document of the Commission's Services SEC(89)1958, Brussels, 10 November 1989, p.1

<sup>292</sup> Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, op. cit. note 23, pp. 86-87.

as a whole, a series of individual agreements were negotiated over the next several years.<sup>293</sup>

The Community revised its policy further. Although the GMP called for free trade in industrial goods and indeed abolished tariffs on imports of the non-member Mediterranean country textiles, the Community began to apply quantitative import restrictions on these products.<sup>294</sup> Due to the recession and the high unemployment rates a ban on immigration was implemented.<sup>295</sup> Financial aid decreased and some cooperative projects were thwarted because of lack of funds.<sup>296</sup>

Southern enlargement of the Community (Greece (1981), Portugal and Spain (1986)) was another detrimental factor for the GMP. The expansion posed the threat to the states of the southern Mediterranean that their traditional exports would be increasingly disadvantaged in the EC markets, given that the new members produced many of the same goods.<sup>297</sup> As a result of this, not only would internal demand be met by the Community suppliers for many of these products, but the CAP would assure that this internal production maintained an unbeatable market advantage over any outside producers.<sup>298</sup>

Thus, by 1989 there was a general agreement that Community efforts to assist the non-member Mediterranean countries proceeded to slowly and had lacked a coherent plan. Lack of will was also an important reason for the failure in addition to the oil crisis, recession, insufficient funds and enlargement. The Commission

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<sup>293</sup> Ibid.

<sup>294</sup> Ibid., p.100.

<sup>295</sup> Altunışık, op. cit. note 284, p.360.

<sup>296</sup> Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, op. cit. note 23 p. 97.

<sup>297</sup> Niblock, op. cit. note 106, p.122.

<sup>298</sup> Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, op. cit. note 23, p.99.

admitted that the policies of the GMP had not been successful and that cooperation policy would have to be redefined.<sup>299</sup>

### **3.1.3. The Redirected Mediterranean Policy**

In the 1980s there had been some significant events in the South that could not be ignored by the Community. The economies of the southern countries, not only the oil producing but also the oil importing countries, deteriorated due to the fall of the oil prices. The rapidly growing population combined with the already high unemployment increased migration towards the North. In that period fundamentalist movements in the region got stronger.<sup>300</sup> With its swelling population, increasing poverty, political unrest and growing environmental problems, the Mediterranean was not a region Europe could afford to ignore.<sup>301</sup> As result of this, in 1989 the Community decided to evaluate its Mediterranean policy. The Commission investigated the current situation and prepared a report.<sup>302</sup> In this regard the Community accepted the Redirected Mediterranean Policy (RMP) in December 1990.

The new policy aimed to support the economic reforms already being carried out and to encourage private sector investment, both from domestic savings and European direct investment. It called for a greater support for small and medium-sized enterprises and environmental and regional integration projects. It repeated that the non-member Mediterranean states should be given better access to European markets. The new policy emphasized that the Mediterranean countries should

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<sup>299</sup> Commission of the European Communities, The Exploratory Talks with the Mediterranean Countries and the Applicant Countries and the Commission Proposals Concerning the Implementation of a Mediterranean Policy for the Enlarged Community, report from the Commission to the Council, COM(84)107 final (Brussels, 11 May 1984), p.3.

<sup>300</sup> Altunışık, op. cit. note 284, pp.362-363.

<sup>301</sup> Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, op. cit. note 23, p.128.

participate more directly in Community programs in areas such as agriculture, energy, taxation, business, transport, macro-economic policies, emigration, population and the environment.

Horizontal cooperation programs introduced under the RMP were innovative. In this regard a series of decentralised cooperation schemes between the both sides of the Mediterranean were launched known as “Med-Programs”. The aim was to mobilise the groups in all civil societies –local authorities, universities, business and the media- and to foster contact, understanding and cooperation between them.<sup>303</sup>

One of the Med-programs was “Med-URBS” which aimed to form networks between municipalities and local authorities in Europe and the non-member Mediterranean countries. “Med-Campus” was designed to strengthen cooperation between universities and other higher education. “Med-Invest” targeted small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the Mediterranean, offering them technical resources and instruction, as well as the opportunity to network with the other SMEs in the Community. “Med-Media” was aimed at filmmakers, television, radio and newspaper journalists, involving them co-productions, training, program exchanges, seminars and workshops to improve the quality of media. “Med-Migration” was designed to promote cooperation and partnerships between local communities in Europe and the non-member Mediterranean countries with respect to the migration issue.<sup>304</sup>

The RMP fell short of expectations. The root cause for the failure was the recurring free trade dispute between the northern and southern EC member states. The former led by Britain, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, favoured open

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<sup>302</sup> Commission of the European Communities, Redirecting the Community’s Mediterranean Policy, report from the Commission to the Council, SEC(89) 1961 final (Brussels, 23 November 1989).

<sup>303</sup> Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, op. cit. note 23, p.133.

<sup>304</sup> Ibid., pp.133-134.

markets, while the later, notably France, Spain, Greece and Portugal emphasized financial support and cooperation. Sensing a threat to their own extensive agricultural sectors, the southern European countries successfully lobbied to prevent Mediterranean farm imports. The northern countries in turn successfully lobbied to prevent substantially increased aid package reaching the region.<sup>305</sup>

As a result of this, the non-member Mediterranean countries were given free access to the EC market for industrial goods and modestly improved access for agricultural products. However the Community was still reluctant to liberalise its agriculture and textile sectors.<sup>306</sup>

The financial aid even though it was nearly three times as much as funding reached the region in the period of 1987-1992 was not sufficient. Some ECU 4.405 billion would be allocated to the non-member Mediterranean states for the period 1992-1996. Of this total, ECU 3.1 billion would be in the form of European Investment Bank (EIB) loans, the remainder in grants. The aid package to the Mediterranean was worth only ECU 2.4 per capita per year compared to ECU 6.8 per capita per year for Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC).<sup>307</sup>

The end of the Cold War harmed the non-member Mediterranean states prospects as much as it helped them. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, they seemed less attractive for the investors.<sup>308</sup> Funds, public and private, flowed eastwards from the member states as investors discovered a vast source of skilled, low-wage workers, both culturally and geographically closer to themselves than the inhabitants

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<sup>305</sup> Ibid., pp. 140-141

<sup>306</sup> Ibid., p. 164.

<sup>307</sup> Alfred Tovias, "The Euro-Mediterranean Policies under Pressure," *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol:2, p.13

<sup>308</sup> Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, op. cit. note 23, p.164.

of the Mediterranean. Now the Mediterranean countries would have to compete head-to-head with the CEECs.<sup>309</sup>

The emergence of single market in Europe in January 1993 had also a negative effect for the non-member Mediterranean countries. The removal of internal barriers would result in price and cost savings for European producers and lower priced European goods would be more competitive against some Mediterranean imports. In short, the RMP did not have significant positive effect for the region. The economies of many non-member states faltered the economic gap between the north and the south of the Mediterranean increased and immigration pressures continued to build.<sup>310</sup>

## **3.2. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership**

### **3.2.1. The Origins of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership**

By 1992 the RMP was under increasing criticism from non-member Mediterranean states on the grounds that it was not doing enough.<sup>311</sup> Hence the European Council in Lisbon in June 1992 called for an expansion of relations with countries south of Europe. In particular it emphasized that a Euro-Maghreb “partnership” should be established which would encompass political and security dialogue, cooperation in social and cultural fields, increased financial and technical cooperation and ultimately a free trade area.<sup>312</sup> The Maghreb countries welcomed the Community’s proposal for a “partnership” and freer markets. But the other non-member Mediterranean countries highly criticised the idea. The continued problems with Libya –which was accused of bombing a aircraft over Lockerbie-, and the

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<sup>309</sup> Ibid., pp. 147-148.

<sup>310</sup> Ibid., p.164.

<sup>311</sup> Winrow, op. cit. note 10, p. 151.

worsening crises in Algeria hindered the cultivation of an exclusively EU-Maghreb axis.<sup>313</sup>

Due to the progress in the peace process, the Commission to underscore the Community's commitment to the process and to remind that Europe, too, had an important role to play in the Middle East issued a communication in September 1993. In this paper it was suggested that the development of the regional economic cooperation could be powerful tool in reducing the level of conflict and in this regard, the Commission proposed a "free trade area" among EU, Israel and Mashreq countries. Some horizontal cooperation projects were also envisioned and the benefits of cooperation in scientific and cultural fields were underscored. It declared that a partnership should be offered to Israel and Mashreq countries similar to that offered to Maghreb.<sup>314</sup> Like Euro-Maghreb Partnership, the idea of an Euro-Mashreq Partnership was abandoned in the mid-1990, in favor of a generalised policy applicable to the entire Mediterranean basin.<sup>315</sup>

In June 1994, the European Council in Corfu instructed the Commission to prepare an upgraded European strategy towards the Mediterranean region. In response, on October 1994, the Commission released a communication and proposed that a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership –rather than a more restricted Euro-Maghreb or Euro-Mashreq partnership- be encouraged. It offered a threefold approach. First, a political and security component called upon the non-member Mediterranean countries to uphold human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Second, an economic and financial component called a process of progressive establishment of

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<sup>312</sup> European Council, Conclusions of the Sessions of the European Council in Lisbon, 26-27 June 1992.

<sup>313</sup> Esther Barbe, "The Barcelona Process: Launching a Pad of Process," *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol:2, No:1, Summer 1996, p.26.

<sup>314</sup> Commission of the European Communities, Future Relations and Cooperation between the Community and the Middle East, Communication from the Commission, COM (93)375 final (Brussels, 8 September 1993).

free trade supported by substantial financial aid. Third, a social, cultural and humanitarian part called for cooperation in a variety of fields. It was also suggested that ECU 5.5 billion be offered to support the EU's Mediterranean policy for the period 1995 to 1999. Finally the Commission called for a ministerial conference in 1995 between the EU member states and the non-member Mediterranean states to set forth guidelines for further cooperation measures.<sup>316</sup>

In December 1994, the European Council in Essen approved the Commission's proposals and decided to hold a conference in Barcelona to discuss political, economic, financial, human, societal and security issues related to the Mediterranean.<sup>317</sup>

The Council of Ministers, meeting in Luxemburg in June 1995 proposed to decrease the amount of the financial aid to ECU 3.5 billion. Germany and Britain had a great influence on this proposal. They were in favor of aid to CEEC rather than the Mediterranean states. But in the heads of state and government meeting in Cannes, later that month, the amount was increased to ECU 4.685 billion, to which loans and other financing provided by the EIB would be later added. France and Spain were the main supporters of this decision. But the CEEC received 6.7 billion or about twice as much as the Mediterranean states in per capita in the same term.<sup>318</sup>

There were also disagreements over the composition of the participants. The first stumbling block was the attitude of Syria and Lebanon who were not very willing to participate in a ministerial meeting with Israel. Another country to a lesser degree and for different reasons, raised doubts about attending the conference was

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<sup>315</sup> Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, op.cit. note 23, pp.139-140.

<sup>316</sup> Commission of the European Communities, Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(94)427 final (Brussels, 19 October 1994).

<sup>317</sup> European Council, Conclusions of the Session of the European Council of Essen, 9-10 December 1994.

<sup>318</sup> Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, op. cit. note 23, p.219.



Morocco. Rabat's attitude was based on a wish to maintain its privileged relations with the EU. All these problems were solved by negotiations and these countries accepted to attend. Libya requested to participate in the conference and the Arab World insisted on the inclusion of Libya. But the majority of the EU countries, particularly France and Britain, vetoed the idea. Eventually Libya withdrew its request. The US, Russia and the Gulf countries showed an interest in the event. The US wanted to participate fully, whereas Russia requested observer status. However only observer status was given to the US.<sup>319</sup>

### **3.2.2. The Barcelona Process**

In November 1995, at the conference organized by the Spanish presidency of EU in Barcelona, the fifteen members of the Union came together with the twelve non-member Mediterranean countries. The Barcelona Declaration issued at the end of the conference announced that the objective was to turn the Mediterranean region into "an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity."<sup>320</sup> The declaration called for an establishment of a comprehensive partnership among the participants in three different –so called- baskets:

- 1) The political and security partnership;
- 2) The economic and financial partnership;
- 3) The partnership in social, cultural and human affairs.

It was the most ambitious, comprehensive, coherent cooperation framework in the region. By combining all three chapters into one comprehensive policy, it acknowledged that financial, economic, cultural and security issues can not be

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<sup>319</sup> Barbe, op. cit. note 313, pp.33-34.

<sup>320</sup> Barcelona Declaration op. cit. note 3.

effectively tackled separately.<sup>321</sup> It assumed that these aspects are inseparable, interdependent: there can not be progress in one of these aspects that is not based on progress in the others.<sup>322</sup> It was strongly emphasized that stability in the Mediterranean region was closely linked to its economic and social development.<sup>323</sup>

Euro-Mediterranean Committee of the EMP was established, consisting of officials from the EU troika (the current, previous and next council presidencies) and from all twelve southern Mediterranean countries. It was decided that the committee should meet regularly (every three months) and report to the foreign ministers. It was also decided that the foreign ministers of all partner countries would meet periodically to review the progress in implementing the principles of the Barcelona Declaration and to agree on actions that would promote the objectives. This would lead to intergovernmental discussions on issues such as water resources, energy policy, industry, tourism and environment. This was a substantial advance compared to the earlier European policies and initiatives, which contained no precise follow-up provisions and were dependent on constant ministerial action.<sup>324</sup> More informal gatherings of NGOs representing civil society were encouraged. The European Parliament also initiated contacts with deputies of Mediterranean-partner assemblies and thereby launched interparliamentary dialogue.<sup>325</sup>

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<sup>321</sup> *The Barcelona Process: Five Years on 1995-2000*, Brussels, European Commission, 2000, p.8.

<sup>322</sup> Fouad Zaim, "The Third Generation of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements: A View from the South," *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol: 4, No: 2, Summer 1999, p.37.

<sup>323</sup> Jorge Montealegre Buire, WEU's Role in the Mediterranean and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership," *CIAO Working Papers*, 1998, p.2.

<sup>324</sup> Dimitris K. Xenakis, "Order and Change in the Euro-Mediterranean System," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol:11, No:1, Winter 2000, p.86.

<sup>325</sup> Winrow, op. cit note 10, p.209.

### **3.2.2.1. The Political and Security Partnership**

The first chapter of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiative is titled: “Political and Security Partnership: Establishing an area of Peace and Stability.” The chapter points out that the parties will

- act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems;
- promote tolerance between different groups in society and combat manifestations of intolerance, racism and xenophobia;
- respect the equal rights of people and their right to self-determination;
- respect the territorial integrity and unity of each of the other partners;
- respect their sovereign equality;
- refrain from any direct or indirect intervention in the internal affairs of another party;
- settle their disputes by peaceful means;
- refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence requirements;
- promote regional security by acting, inter alia, in favor of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation through adherence to and compliance with a combination of international and regional non-proliferation regimes, and arms control and disarmament agreements such as NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT;
- promote conditions likely to develop good-neighbourly relations among themselves and support processes aimed stability, security, prosperity and regional and subregional cooperation;

- strengthen their cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism;
- fight against the expansion and the diversification of organized crime and combat the drug problems;
- consider any confidence and security-building measures that could be taken between the parties with a view to the creation of an “area peace and stability in the Mediterranean”, including the long term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end.<sup>326</sup>

The chapter also stipulated that one aim was to secure “a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of WMD, nuclear, chemical and biological and their delivery means.”

There were/are serious disagreements over the issues written in the security chapter. That is why there are generally wage terms. Europeans were criticized by the southern partners that they were imposing their values on the Arab Countries.<sup>327</sup>

The southern Mediterranean regimes tend to consider EU insistence on the achievement of political reforms, human rights and the rule of law as interference to their domestic affairs.<sup>328</sup> The Arab states remain, as a whole, fundamentally suspicious of and even hostile to any form of Western intervention, especially when it occurs in the name of international law or the right of intervention. The West is accused of seeking new ways to impose its hegemony while hiding behind the pretext of democratic principles and their universality.<sup>329</sup> The ruling elites claim that democracy is a western model and not suitable for other societies.

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<sup>326</sup> Barcelona Declaration, op. cit. note 3

<sup>327</sup> Barbe, op. cit. note 313, p.35.

<sup>328</sup> Robert Aliboni, Abdel Monem Said Aly, “Challenges and Prospects,” in *The Barcelona: Process: Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community*, p.213.

<sup>329</sup> May Chartouni Dubarry, “Political Transition in the Middle East,” in *The Barcelona: Process: Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community*, p.59.

On the other side, the Europeans insist on the interdependence between security and democracy, believing in that democratic states make peaceful neighbours, as they have experienced in their own modern history.<sup>330</sup>

The distinction between the terrorist groups and those fighting for liberation and independence was also a difficult subject. Syria insisted on linking the right to self-determination to the legitimate right to fight against territorial occupiers. Israel, for its part, did not agree with the reference to self-determination to territorial integrity because of their significance for Southern Lebanon and the Palestinians. On the fight against terrorism, Syria's wish to make distinction regarding the struggle against the occupiers of a territory was not included.<sup>331</sup>

The major differences of opinion between the Arab states and Israel concerning the proliferation of WMD was also an important stumbling block. "Although the Barcelona declaration referred to the elimination of WMD from the Middle East, it tended to focus on chemical and biological weapons, leaving Israeli nuclear arsenal untouched" says an Egyptian analyst.<sup>332</sup>

There is a strong feeling among the Arab states that the EU is giving Israel preferential treatment. Israeli nuclear program has never been identified as a danger by the Western power. But the nuclear ambitions of the Arab countries and Iran (even though these countries signed the NPT) have always been condemned.<sup>333</sup>

Arab states wanted more explicit statements with respect to the elimination of the Israeli nuclear weapons, which was unacceptable for Israeli officials because of the reasons mentioned in the first chapter. And also without the active involvement

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<sup>330</sup> Dominic Fenech, "The Relevance of European Security Structures to the Mediterranean (and Vice Versa)," in *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Political and Economic Perspectives*, ed by Richard Gillespie, London, Frank Cass, 1997, pp.155-156.

<sup>331</sup> Barbe, op. cit. note 313, p.39.

<sup>332</sup> Mohammad El-Sayed Selim, "Arab Perceptions of the European Union's Euro-Mediterranean Projects," in *Mediterranean Security into the Coming Millennium*, p.155.

<sup>333</sup> Boniface, op. cit. note 48, pp.173-174.

of the US and without the inclusion of Libya, Iran and Iraq, Israel rejects to discuss the issue to make a significant step towards denuclearisation of the region. The presence of operational nuclear weapons in Israel complicates the efforts to promote regional cooperative security measures. Because Israeli stance is taken by the Arab states and Iran to pursue their own programs of WMD.<sup>334</sup>

The Arab World is also concerned about the nuclear warheads in Europe. They want France and Britain to fulfil their obligations under the NPT, such as the gradual reduction of their nuclear capabilities and the transfer of nuclear technology to the developing countries for peaceful purposes. They would prefer to see the Mediterranean region an area of free of WMD.<sup>335</sup> Because of their military superiority, the countries in the north fuel the fears of those in the south.<sup>336</sup> The Arab World criticize the declaration in that it has not mentioned the military power gap between the North and the South. They suspect that Europe has not ruled out the use of force if it is necessary to achieve European goals.<sup>337</sup>

Hence the conference began with a series of problems still to be resolved. The problems of the Middle East were much in the air: there were the questions of the problem of non-proliferation, on the hand, and the controversy about terrorism and the fight for self-determination, on the other. The closing ceremony was delayed by more than two hours because of the difficulties encountered in reaching a consensus on these issues.<sup>338</sup> Finally, the Spanish presidency decided to be firm. With the backing of the all the EU partners, the Spain foreign minister presented, in the form of an ultimatum, the text that was adopted finally. Any country that would not accept

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<sup>334</sup> Fred Tanner, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Prospects for Arms Limitation and Confidence Building," in *The Barcelona: Process: Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community*, p.196.

<sup>335</sup> Selim, op. cit. note 332, p.141.

<sup>336</sup> Boniface, op. cit. note 48, p.183.

<sup>337</sup> Selim, op. cit. note 332, p.156.

<sup>338</sup> Barbe, op. cit. note 313, pp.36-37.

it would bear the responsibility for the failure of the conference. In particular, both Israel and Syria, who disagreed on some points, thus ended up by accepting the text.<sup>339</sup>

Because of the difficulties experienced over political and security questions, it is little surprising that the section of the work program relating to this basket, is the shortest. There are no precise statements about how the principles adopted in this section would be implemented.<sup>340</sup> However, all the parties have continued political dialogue, even during the periods of stalemate in the Middle East peace process, within the Barcelona framework. It was the only political multilateral forum in which representatives of Syria and Lebanon regularly participated in talks with their counterparts from Israel.<sup>341</sup>

The failure of the second Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference which took place in Malta in April 1997 demonstrated that while the success of the EMP was dependent upon the advancement of the peace process, the EMP had had very little, if any at all, on the Middle East peace process.<sup>342</sup>

The main task at the ministerial meeting in Malta was for the member states to elaborate more specifically on implementation of the partnership program and to set up short-term action plans so that tangible cooperative ventures could commence. At the top of the agenda was the endorsement of, or at least elaboration, of a security charter that would lay the foundations for the peaceful resolution of crisis situations and conflicts throughout the Euro-Mediterranean area. Such a charter would enable the partners to identify the factors of friction and tension in the Euro-Mediterranean area and to carry out an assessment of how such destabilising focal points can be

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<sup>339</sup> Ibid., p.40.

<sup>340</sup> Ibid.

<sup>341</sup> The Barcelona Process: Five Years On, op. cit. note 321, p.8.

managed.<sup>343</sup> In short, the main purpose was to institutionalise the political dialogue and set up concrete mechanisms to address security and stability questions relevant to the region.

But the deterioration of the Arab-Israeli relations since the election of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in May 1996 prevented any progress. The meeting failed to agree to guidelines and principles for this charter. The Arab side indicated that because of current difficulties in the peace process the charter could not be adopted. Arab delegates could see little sense in agreeing a charter that sought to prevent future conflicts but avoided tackling ongoing disputes.<sup>344</sup> Arab representatives also wanted the charter to focus on issues such as proliferation of WMD, in particular the question of Israeli nuclear weapons and socioeconomic problems including the issues of migration and debt.<sup>345</sup>

However the senior officials responsible for the political and security dialogue have met regularly, at least four times a year, since 1995 to discuss the drafting of the charter. In the third ministerial meeting in Stuttgart, foreign ministers agreed on the guidelines for the charter and that the text of the charter itself should be ready at their next formal meeting in Marsellies in November 2000. It was also agreed in Stuttgart that the charter would be formally adopted when political circumstances allow. The main elements of the guidelines for the charter were:

- politically not legally binding,
- rule of consensus for decision making,

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<sup>342</sup> Stephen C. Calleya, "Security Considerations in the Euro-Mediterranean Area," paper presented at the Halki International Seminars, Greece, 7-14 September 1998, p.1.

<sup>343</sup> Stephen C. Calleya, "The Euro-Mediterranean Process after Malta: What Prospects?"

*Mediterranean Politics*, Vol:2, No:2, Autumn 1997, p.4.

<sup>344</sup> Claire Spencer, "Building Confidence in the Mediterranean," *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol:2, No:2, Autumn 1997, p.36.

<sup>345</sup> Fred Tanner, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Prospects for Arms Control and Confidence Building after Malta," *The International Spectator*, Vol:32, No: 2, April-June 1997, p.6.



- focus on political and security issues but cover also economic, social, cultural and human affairs in so far as they affect political and security issues,
- promotion of human rights, democracy, tolerance and mutual understanding,
- cooperation on organised crime, terrorism, non-proliferation of WMD,
- conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict reconstruction.<sup>346</sup>

Negotiation of the charter proceeded in the run-up to the Marsellies conference in November 2000. However, in view of deterioration of the political climate in the region, ministers at Marsellies therefore welcomed the work done so far but agreed to defer adoption of any text.<sup>347</sup>

In spite of the endemic problems of the region, senior official and ad hoc meetings on political and security questions decided some cooperative activities. Among them are some “partnership building measures” designed to create trust and build confidence, including a series of information and training seminars for Euro-Mediterranean diplomats held semi-annually in Malta and the Euro-Mediterranean network of foreign policy institutes (EuroMeSCo). These efforts are reinforced by cooperation among civil protection services for disaster management.<sup>348</sup>

The Malta Seminars began in October 1996. These four-day seminars are managed by the Mediterranean Academy for diplomatic studies in Malta and with close cooperation with the European Commission, and are financed by the EU. The seminars aim to provide the participants with regular and updated information as well as issues for discussion on the three chapters of the Barcelona Process. In

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<sup>346</sup> Information Notes on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, European Commission External Directorate-General, January 2001, p.19

<sup>347</sup> Ibid.

<sup>348</sup> Five years after Barcelona: Five Years On, op. cit. note 32, p.5.

particular, this information provides an account of the developments undergone on these various aspects, between each session. Moreover, these seminars allow the establishment of informal contacts between the participants and the progressive creation of a network of Euro-Mediterranean diplomats.<sup>349</sup>

Also a network of international affairs and strategic studies institutes in the region, known as EuroMeSCo, has been established in June 1996 under the coordination of the Lisbon Institute of Strategic Studies (IEEI). The network includes 34 member institutes and 7 observers. It contributes to the dialogue between civil societies on crucial topics of the partnership and supports the work of senior officials as necessary. Two Working Parties were formed: on political and security cooperation, which includes the issues of democratisation, social changes and the economic aspects of security. The second Working Party deals with confidence building measures, disarmament and conflict prevention and the all the aspects of the preventive diplomacy. Several meetings of the working parties and two informal joint meetings with senior officials were held which permitted the development of the debate on the political dialogue. Also annual conferences are organised by the EuroMeSCo.<sup>350</sup>

The project for cooperation between the civil protection organisations of the 27 partners can be considered under the “partnership building measures”. It aims at the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean system of prevention, of reduction and of management of natural and man made disasters. It deals with the major generic risks which represents the greatest dangers in terms of massive loss of lives and of property (earthquakes, floods, forest and industrial fires...)<sup>351</sup>

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<sup>349</sup> Information Notes, op. cit. note p.26.

<sup>350</sup> Ibid., p.20-21.

<sup>351</sup> Ibid., p.24-25.

The cooperation network between civil protection services of the 27 partners concentrates on:

- training and information,
- exchange of experts,
- network of civil protection schools,
- technical assistance,
- awareness-raising and the education of citizens.

By developing the exchange of experience, cooperation and training between the European and Mediterranean civil protection authorities, the project aims at contributing to political confidence within the partnership.<sup>352</sup>

Even though the initiative was able to bring together Israel and Syria to the same table, it appears that there will be no dramatic progress in the political-security chapter of the Barcelona Process while serious problems remain in the Middle East.<sup>353</sup>

#### **3.2.2.2. The Economic and Financial Partnership**

Although the EU is concerned primarily with political stability, it does not necessarily seek to achieve it through political dialogue. Political, social and cultural objectives, including political stability, are primarily sought through economic growth, which is itself supposed to flow from policies of free trade and economic liberalization.<sup>354</sup> Hence, the second chapter entitled “Economic and Financial

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<sup>352</sup> Ibid., p.24

<sup>353</sup> Winrow, op. cit. note 10, p.216.

<sup>354</sup> Eberhard Kienle, “Destabilization through Partnership? Euro-Mediterranean Relations after Barcelona Declaration,” *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol:3, No:2, Autumn 1998, p.3.

Partnership” is regarded as the heart of the declaration and the engine of the process.<sup>355</sup>

The central economic objective is the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone (FTZ) by 2010 achieved by the progressive dismantlement of tariffs.<sup>356</sup> It is expected that by this way economic and social development of the south will be achieved and an area of shared prosperity will be created. And this shared prosperity will bring about peace, stability and security to the whole region. The logic behind this argument is based on the predicted impact that the actual announcement of the creation of FTZ and economic liberalization may have on foreign investors –a phenomenon which has been observed during the implementation of other FTZs.<sup>357</sup>

Helped by low wages, growth in investment would increase export revenues and improve the trade balance. Export revenues would, in turn, contribute to the reduction of external debt, even though the instruments of the partnership fail to address this issue in detail. Investments would also lead to job creation, productivity and, more generally, to an increase in revenues and an improvement in the standard of living, which would reduce migration flows significantly. On the political level, this new prosperity could reinforce the stability of the countries concerned. This stability and prosperity could facilitate political liberalization and transition to democracy. In turn this would contribute to the stability of the EU.<sup>358</sup>

This is to be achieved by means of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements negotiated between the EU and 9 out of the 12 Mediterranean partners, together with free trade agreements between the partners themselves.<sup>359</sup> Negotiations

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<sup>355</sup> Richard Edis, “Does the Barcelona Process Matter?” *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol:3, No:3, Winter 1998, p.97.

<sup>356</sup> Ibid.

<sup>357</sup> Alvaro Vasconcelos and George Joffe, “Towards Euro-Mediterranean Regional Integration,” in *The Barcelona Process: Building Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community*, p.13.

<sup>358</sup> Kienle, op. cit. note 354, pp.3-4.

<sup>359</sup> Information Notes, op. cit. note 346, p.35.

for agreements have been concluded between the Union and Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, Jordan and Palestinian Authority. All these agreements have been ratified and with the exception the Jordanian agreement are in force. Negotiations with Egypt have been concluded, but the agreement waits to be signed; negotiations are still under way with Lebanon, Algeria and Syria.<sup>360</sup>

Even though the provisions of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements governing bilateral relations vary from one Mediterranean partner to the other, they have certain aspects in common:

- the establishment of free trade area over a transitional period, which may last up to 12 years from the date of the entry into force of the agreement,
- custom duties on EU exports of industrial products to the partner are to be eliminated gradually during the transitional period, partners' exports of these products already have duty free access to the EU;
- economic cooperation in a wide range of sectors;
- the adjustment provisions relating to competition, state aids and monopolies;
- the gradual liberalization of arrangements on public procurement;
- the gradual liberalization of trade in services;
- the maintenance of high level of protection of intellectual property rights;
- political dialogue;
- respect for human rights and democracy;
- cooperation relating to social affairs and migration;

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<sup>360</sup> The European Commission, External Relations, "The Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area," [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/med\\_mideast/euro\\_med\\_partnership/free\\_trade](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/euro_med_partnership/free_trade)

- cultural cooperation.<sup>361</sup>

With the other three partners Turkey, Greek Cypriot Government and Malta, relations are governed by pre-existing association agreements. As a result of Turkey's association agreement, a customs union with the EU entered into force on 1 January 1996. With Greek Cypriot Government, a customs union is planned to be established in 2001-2002.

Because dismantling customs union requires substantial reform to the fiscal, economic and industrial sectors, the EU aims to provide support to these economic reforms in the public and private sector by the MEDA program. It is the main financial instrument of the EU for the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It is entirely made up of grants, as opposed to the complementary financial support given by the European Investment Bank (EIB) which comes in the form of repayable loans. For the period 1995 to 1999 MEDA accounted for ECU 3.435 billion out of the total funds of ECU 4.685 billion allocated to the Mediterranean partners. However several difficulties have led to a low disbursement rate (26% ECU 890 million at the end of 1999).<sup>362</sup>

Some 86 % of the budgetary resources allocated to MEDA are channelled bilaterally to 9 Mediterranean partners (all but Greek Cypriot Government, Israel and Malta due to their relatively high GDP). The other 14 % of the resources are devoted to regional activities from which all the partners are eligible to benefit.<sup>363</sup>

The priorities for MEDA resources at the bilateral level are support to economic transition, support for the creation of an environment favorable to the

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<sup>361</sup> The European Commission, External Relations, "The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements,"

[http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/med\\_mideast/euro\\_med\\_partnership/med\\_ass](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/euro_med_partnership/med_ass)

<sup>362</sup> European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process, Brussels, 6.9.2000, COM(00)497 Final, annex.

<sup>363</sup> The European Commission, External Relations, "The MEDA Program," [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/med\\_mideast/euro\\_med\\_partnership/meda\\_ht...](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/euro_med_partnership/meda_ht...)

development of the private sector, activities in the social sector (health, education, insurance etc.) which aim to support the socio-economic balance in the partner countries and to mitigate the short term negative effects of economic transition, support for rural development programs, activities in environment.<sup>364</sup>

The regional programs are expected to complement and reinforce the bilateral programs in all three domains of the Barcelona Declaration. Priority has been given to industrial cooperation, environment, water, energy, transport and the information society.<sup>365</sup> EuroMeSCo, the Malta Seminars, cooperation between the civil protection services and all of the Med-Programs are financed by the MEDA funds. For 2000-2006 MEDA is endowed with ECU 5.350 billion.<sup>366</sup>

Nevertheless, all of the dimensions of the EMP, the economic ones were the most severely and widely criticised, not only by the Arabs but also by some of the European analysts. They argue that there is no guarantee that free trade and liberalization recommended under the EU's new Mediterranean policy will have the anticipated effects.<sup>367</sup>

It is a FTZ between one country on the one hand and a group of countries on the other; between economies with unequal level of development; between economies with unequal level of mutual protection. They argue that these characteristics mean that Mediterranean FTZ does not fit into the classic pattern of FTZ creation in which two or more countries with comparable levels of development and protection agree on the modalities of trade barrier removal. The implementation

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<sup>364</sup> Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process, op. cit. note 362.

<sup>365</sup> Ibid.

<sup>366</sup> Information Note, op. cit. note 346, p.13

<sup>367</sup> Kienle, op. cit. note 354, p.5.

of the FTZ in the Barcelona context is therefore characterised by obvious asymmetry.<sup>368</sup>

The critics claim that the creation of the FTZ by removing the trade barriers directed against European products, while restricting the southern states agricultural export in which they are in advantageous position in comparison to the North to some extent and preventing of freedom of movement of people can not serve for the interest of the southern states. The FTZ established by opening of southern markets to northern products may result in, instead of flow of FDI, disinvestment in the countries concerned.<sup>369</sup> Most of the local industries can not compete with European ones and this will result in the destruction of indigenous industrial production.<sup>370</sup> A study has predicted that the increased competition could see some 2000 local Tunisian companies go into bankruptcy and the status of a further 2000 would be questionable without sufficient support during the transition period.<sup>371</sup> This will not contribute to the creation of new jobs. Another study suggests that the partnership may entail loss of up to 40 percent of existing jobs.<sup>372</sup>

Also the custom revenue will be reduced significantly which constitutes an important source for the states. To compensate this reduction they can increase taxation which will lead to demand control and thus to restrictions on investment, production and employment.<sup>373</sup>

They also criticize that the question of the foreign debt of non-member Mediterranean states are not sufficiently dealt with in the Euro-Mediterranean

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<sup>368</sup> Hafedh Zaafrane and Azzem Mahjoub, "The Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone: Economic Challenges and Social Impacts on the Countries of the South and East Mediterranean," in *The Barcelona Process: Building Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community*, pp.17-18.

<sup>369</sup> Kienle, op. cit. note 354, p.6.

<sup>370</sup> Selim, op. cit. note 332, p.154

<sup>371</sup> Jon Marks, "High Hopes and Low Motives: The New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative," *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol:1, No:1, Summer 1996, pp.17-18.

<sup>372</sup> Kienle, op. cit. note 354, p.8.

<sup>373</sup> Zaafrane and Mahjoub, op. cit. note 368, pp.21-22.



process.<sup>374</sup> Although the amount of the economic aid promised to the Mediterranean countries was the largest in the history of EU-Mediterranean relations, the critics contended that such aid, if compared with what has been promised to Eastern Europe, was insufficient.<sup>375</sup> Funds released by the EU within the framework of the partnership in 1995-1999 only amounted to less than \$100 million per country per year, in addition to the loans granted by the EIB and to bilateral aid. It is argued that this amount of aid can not finance major structural transformations in the southern Mediterranean states.<sup>376</sup> However access to the market is more important for the countries of the south than is the growth of financial aid through MEDA program.<sup>377</sup>

If the FTZ will be successful, it will result in one of the largest free trade areas in the world, covering 600 to 800 million inhabitants of some 30-40 countries. Although free trade in itself is likely to increase the level of trade between the northern and southern countries of the Mediterranean, there is nothing to guarantee that this will necessarily reduce the wide level of economic disparities that currently exist.<sup>378</sup>

A FTZ can be beneficial if only mobilizes a substantial flow of FDI to the south. Without a substantial increase in investment, there is little hope that southern Mediterranean countries will be able to increase substantially their export revenues and thus repay their public debt.<sup>379</sup> But the region is unattractive to investors, no amount of tariff reduction can stimulate new capital flows and employment

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<sup>374</sup> Joseph Licari, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Economic and Financial Aspects," *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol:3, No:3, Winter 1998, p.12.

<sup>375</sup> Selim, op. cit. note 332, p.154.

<sup>376</sup> Kienle, op. cit. note 354, p.7.

<sup>377</sup> Zaim, op. cit. note 372 p.46.

<sup>378</sup> Calleya, op. cit. note 342, p.9.

<sup>379</sup> Kienle, op. cit. note 354 p.7

creation.<sup>380</sup> The investors don't want to risk their money without peace, stability and security in the individual states and the region as a whole.

No free trade agreements have been concluded among the Mediterranean partners and without a real peace in the chronic dispute such agreements are not expected. Just the association agreements are not enough to attract investors.<sup>381</sup> Because the region does not offer a new economic opportunity when compared to other parts of the World. Fiscal, administrative and legal reforms as well as deregulation of public services are in slow process which makes the region more nuisance.<sup>382</sup>

Without substantial outside support, without free access of agricultural products and without free movement of people, southern Mediterranean states seem unlikely to be able to improve their conditions. The social situation can worsen and this in turn can ignite problems.

### **3.2.2.3. Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human Affairs**

The third chapter, which complements the first one, puts forth the idea that the countries concerned should work to encourage the participation of civil society in the EMP. Participation would involve joint efforts in education and training; social development; policies designed to reduce migratory pressures; the fight against drug trafficking, terrorism and international crime; judicial cooperation; the fight against racism and xenophobia; and a campaign against corruption.<sup>383</sup>

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<sup>380</sup> Marks, op. cit. note 371, p.22.

<sup>381</sup> Eberhard Rhein, "Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area for 2010: Whom will benefit?" in *The Perspectives on Development: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, ed. by George Joffe, London: Frank Cass, 2000, p.15

<sup>382</sup> The Barcelona Process: Five Years On, op. cit. note 321, p.17.

<sup>383</sup> Stephen C. Calleya, "Crosscultural Currents in the Mediterranean: What Prospects?" *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol:9, No:3, Summer 1998, p.56.

Further ideas that have been proposed include joint efforts with regard to culture, media, health policy and the promotion of exchanges and development of contact among young people in the framework of decentralized cooperation programs. Throughout the process there has been an emphasis on the importance of dialogue between cultures and exchanges at human, scientific and technological levels, deemed as an essential factor bringing people closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of one another.<sup>384</sup>

In this regard new “Med-Programs” were launched: the Euromed-Heritage Program aimed at the preservation and the development of the Euro-Mediterranean cultural heritage.<sup>385</sup> The Euromed Audiovisual Program brings together European and Mediterranean operators in the audiovisual sector. This program aims to contribute to the regional projects in the fields of radio, television, and cinema, particularly in the following areas: preservation of archives, production and co-production support, support to broadcasting/distribution and circulation of audiovisual products.<sup>386</sup>

The Euromed-Youth aims to improve mutual comprehension and cohesion between young people across the Mediterranean basin, based on and committed to mutual respect, tolerance and dialogue between the various cultures. Furthermore it aims at increasing the importance of youth organisations, developing active citizenship of young people and especially young women and promoting the exchange of information, experience and expertise between youth organisations.<sup>387</sup>

Med-Techno seeks to promote the use of efficient technologies in the field of treatment and re-use of waste water and the use of renewable energy sources. It

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<sup>384</sup> Ibid.

<sup>385</sup> Information Notes, op. cit. note 346, p.81.

<sup>386</sup> Ibid., p.83.

<sup>387</sup> Ibid., p. 92.

involves the creation of networks of scientists, technicians, firms, local administrations and public authorities, as well as NGOs concerned with research and technological development.<sup>388</sup> Med-Avicenne supports research institutes, promotes science and technology cooperation and funds joint research programs in the EU and the non-member Mediterranean countries.<sup>389</sup>

In addition the EU has given particular consideration to promoting human rights and democracy in the Mediterranean partners. MEDA Democracy, a program launched in 1996 and intended to promote human rights in the twelve Mediterranean partners has so far financed 171 operations which aimed to promote democracy, the rule of law, freedom of expression and the protection of vulnerable groups (woman, youth).<sup>390</sup>

Immediately after the Barcelona Conference, a Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum gathered some 1200 European and Mediterranean social, economic and cultural agents to establish links between societies across Mediterranean. The second Civil Forum devoted to cultural issues in 1997 brought together major representatives civil society as well as European and Mediterranean institutions.<sup>391</sup> In order to develop the parliamentary dimension of the Barcelona Process, a Euro-Med Parliamentary Forum was held in Brussels in October 1998, for the first time bringing together more than a hundred parliamentarians from all over the EU and the Mediterranean.<sup>392</sup>

In European circles it is widely believed in that bottom-up approaches are better than the state led policies for effective reforms. Cooperation among civil

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<sup>388</sup> Maurizio Giammusso, "Civil Society Initiatives and Prospects of Economic Development: The Euro-Mediterranean Decentralized Co-operation Networks," *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol:4, No:1, Spring 1999, p.30.

<sup>389</sup> Ibid.

<sup>390</sup> Information Notes, op. cit. note 346, p.28.

<sup>391</sup> Ibid., p.90.

<sup>392</sup> Ibid., p.94.

societies is considered an essential element of democratic reforms. Hence, the programs are launched as an instrument to support civil societies and cooperation among them, and ultimately to encourage democratization in the non-member Mediterranean countries.<sup>393</sup> These programs are expected, at least, to serve as a series of confidence building measures.

However, the future success of these programs is highly questionable. Because the present socio-political context of the most of the non-member Mediterranean countries seems inappropriate for the proliferation of initiatives of civil society institutions.<sup>394</sup> Civil society culture in the south is not developed as much as that of the North. Radical Islamic movements regard civil society initiatives as part of western civilization and intrinsically corrupt. They oppose the development of them. The dominance of such visions of society affects the participation of civil society organizations in decentralized networks with European partners. Such cooperations are regarded as leading to “westernisation”.<sup>395</sup>

Also the regimes are suspicious of the cultural and social basket of the EMP, because this encourages direct contacts with independent groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) between the two shores of the Mediterranean. Governments find it difficult to control and fear that flow of information will presage a wave of disaffection and potential dissidence.<sup>396</sup> In the most of the non-member Mediterranean countries the relations between civil society and the state are characterized by reciprocal suspicion and/or confusion. Even when tolerated, most organizations are closely controlled by the state.<sup>397</sup>

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<sup>393</sup> Giammusso, op. cit. note 388, p.25.

<sup>394</sup> Ibid., p.25.

<sup>395</sup> Ibid. p.38.

<sup>396</sup> Joffe, op. cit. note 110, p.27.

<sup>397</sup> Giammusso, op. cit. note 388, p.47.

Israel was also doubtful about the decentralized programs. Because it was sensitive to the impression that Barcelona's cultural basket was essentially about Euro-Islamic dialogue.<sup>398</sup> Because of the reasons mentioned the results of the Euro-Mediterranean decentralized cooperation programs will be more modest than intended by those who designed them.<sup>399</sup>

Overall, the EU, because of its comprehensive approach to the problems in the region and because of its economic power, is the best institution that can provide security and stability in the Mediterranean region. It can deal with the root causes of the problems that are mainly economic. People to people contacts can contribute to alleviating the misperceptions between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. Progress on the second and the third basket can pave the way for the first one. But, in addition to the Arab-Israeli conflict, lack of political will, lack of coherence among the member states, reluctance to waste more money slow down the process.

### **3.3. The WEU's Mediterranean Dialogue**

The WEU is also involved in Mediterranean cooperation. In the Petersberg Declaration of June 1992, the WEU Council entrusted the presidency and secretariat to develop ties with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. The discussions –later extended to Egypt, Mauritania, Israel and Jordan- have as their main purpose the exchange of views on security and defence issues affecting the Mediterranean region.<sup>400</sup>

Dialogue takes place between the WEU representatives and officials and Mediterranean partner ambassadors in Brussels. Political talks are supported by a

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<sup>398</sup> Richard Youngs, "The Barcelona Process after the UK Presidency: The Need for Prioritization," *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol:4, No:1, Spring 1999, p.14.

<sup>399</sup> Giammusso, op. cit. note 388, p.47

<sup>400</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, op. cit. note 6, p.38

series of activities, including seminars on Mediterranean security, occasional briefings by the WEU military staff and planning cells, information seminars involving military staff from WEU and Mediterranean partner countries and visits to WEU satellite center.<sup>401</sup>

In these discussions WEU officials also talk of the significance for the Mediterranean of WEU's so called Petersberg tasks –humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping missions and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking. The ambassadors are also briefed on the latest WEU Ministerial Meeting. Also the WEU's Institute for security Studies based in Paris organize an annual Mediterranean seminar that is attended by representatives the non-WEU Mediterranean countries. The latest was on “The future of the Euro-Mediterranean Security Dialogue”, in March 2000.<sup>402</sup>

Overall little progress has been achieved in the WEU Mediterranean Dialogue. There are several reasons for that. As in the case of the NATO and the EU, there were divisions in WEU, between the southern and northern members who were more in favor of increasing ties with the central and eastern European states. Lack of solid goals and practical cooperation were the other reasons.<sup>403</sup> The establishment of the European Rapid Operational Force (EUROFOR) and the European Maritime Forces (EUROMARFOR) was the another one.

The announcement of the establishment of the forces was made at the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Lisbon in May 1995. These forces were answerable to WEU. They consisted of units provided by France, Italy, Portugal and Spain.

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<sup>401</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, op. cit. note 12, p.40

<sup>402</sup> Winrow, op. cit. note 10, p.199

<sup>403</sup> Antonio Marquina, “Review of Initiatives on CBMs and CSBMs in the Mediterranean,” in *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, p.67.

Other WEU members could join if the four founding members agree.<sup>404</sup> These were to be nonstanding forces. EUROFOR would be a rapid reaction force of ten to fifteen thousand troops and EUROMARFOR would be a joint naval force.<sup>405</sup>

Both forces could be deployed to implement the so-called Petersberg tasks. In 1996 Euroforces were declared operational. EUROFOR was allocated a headquarters in Florence with a multinational staff working on planning and eventual command and control. The use of either of the Euroforces would need the consent of all four contributing states. They could be called upon by WEU or by other bodies such as NATO, the OSCE or the UN.<sup>406</sup>

The Arab World viewed the creation of these forces with considerable suspicion and was quick to voice their objections in November 1996, when the EUROFOR headquarter opened in Florence. The Petersberg tasks assigned to these forces created uncertainty, especially the peace enforcement component has not sufficiently been understood.<sup>407</sup> Egyptian President Mubarek commented: “the issue needs explanations,” and added “ I fear that it opens the way to interference in other states’ internal affairs.”<sup>408</sup> An Arab Analyst said that the European policy of building forces for the purpose of military intervention in the southern Mediterranean “has no future in the Mediterranean region. It will not be accepted by the public opinion in the area”.<sup>409</sup> There is a general Arab concerns that these forces might be used as

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<sup>404</sup> WEU, Council of Ministers, Lisbon Declaration, Lisbon, , Doc.1445, 15 May 1995, paragraph 5.

<sup>405</sup> Francisco Rapallo, “EUROMARFOR and security Cooperation in the Mediterranean,” in *The Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Security Dialogue*, edited by Martin Ortega, Occasional Papers 14, The Institute for Security Studies WEU, March 2000, p. 30

<sup>406</sup> Winrow, op. cit. note 10, p. 203

<sup>407</sup> Marquina, op. cit. note 400, p.70.

<sup>408</sup> Karen Dabrowska, “The Mediterranean: The Cradle of Armed Conflict,” *Dialogue*, June 1997, p.3.

<sup>409</sup> Abdullah Said, “A Framework for Stability in the Mediteranean,” *Towards a Partnership between Europe and the Mediterranean Region: Security and Peace*, Thomas Sheben eds., Cairo: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, pp.46-47.



instrument to interfere in the internal affairs of Arab states.<sup>410</sup> The Arab policy makers and military officials ask, “how would EU feel if the Arab countries created a force equivalent to Euroforces to be deployed in the Mediterranean?”<sup>411</sup>

The sharp Arab reaction to the establishment of the Euroforces underscores the importance of providing adequate information and properly laying the groundwork for Western initiatives in the region.<sup>412</sup> The Europeans should pay special attention to transparency in developments concerning their military attempts. This could be done through better communication and plans, in particular regarding military doctrines and formation.<sup>413</sup> Later on, in 1997, being aware of this misunderstanding, the member states of the Euroforces have said that they are prepared to implement actions in cooperation with other Mediterranean countries, particularly those which maintain a dialogue with the WEU.<sup>414</sup>

A major problem for WEU in general was the uncertainty with regard to the future of the WEU-EU relationship. Naturally this had serious implications for the WEU Mediterranean Dialogue. Just before the Barcelona Conference, the WEU officials stressed that WEU had to deal with military aspects while the EU had to focus on the other aspects.<sup>415</sup> This was not welcomed by the EU officials who favored comprehensive approach to the problems in the region. Indeed, WEU was not invited to the Barcelona Conference. Apparently, when EU delegations visit non-

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<sup>410</sup> Claire Spencer, “Rethinking or Reorienting Europe’s Mediterranean Security Focus,” *Rethinking Security in post-Cold War Europe*, William Park and G. Wyn Rees eds., New York: Longman, pp.147

<sup>411</sup> An Algerian Academician summarised the Arab concern with respect to the forces with such a question in Halki International Seminar (Greece), *The Mediterranean and the Middle East Looking Ahead* in which I participated in September 2000.

<sup>412</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, op. cit. note 6, p.38

<sup>413</sup> Abdelwahab Biad, Code of Conduct for Good neighbourly Relations in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership,” in *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, p.269

<sup>414</sup> Carlos Echeverria, “Cooperation in Peacekeeping among the Euro-Mediterranean Armed Forces,” Chaillot Paper 35, February 1999, p.17.

<sup>415</sup> Marquina, op. cit. note 400, p.65.

WEU Mediterranean countries, they do not include WEU officials in their ranks as participants or observers.<sup>416</sup>

Now, European leaders agreed to transfer the essential functions of the WEU to the EU. This transfer eventually will lead to the termination of the WEU as an independent institution. Elements of the dialogue are likely to be incorporated in the EU's Barcelona Process.<sup>417</sup> Even though it is not clear how the Mediterranean dimension of the WEU will be subsumed into the EU, the incorporation might be beneficial for the Barcelona Process. The WEU officials, who gained experience throughout the dialogue on the military issues and well informed on the sensitiveness of the non-WEU Mediterranean states, can contribute to the security basket of the Barcelona Process. WEU can also contribute to the process by sharing its experience and knowledge on joint operations concerning humanitarian tasks, assistance to populations in time of crisis or other emergency situations such as search and rescue, evacuation, maritime policing, protection of sea lines and merchant shipping logistic and medical support or minesweeping<sup>418</sup> and, by this way paving the way for practical cooperation among the militaries of the northern and the southern states.

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<sup>416</sup> Winrow, op. cit. note 10, p.201.

<sup>417</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, op. cit. note 12, p.41

## CHAPTER 4: The Mediterranean Dimension of the OSCE

### 4.1. A Short Review of the Helsinki Process and the OSCE Today

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is a security organization whose 55 participating states span the geographical area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. In its region it is the primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post conflict rehabilitation.<sup>419</sup>

Since its inception, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and now the OSCE has taken a broad and comprehensive view of security.<sup>420</sup> That is to say, that all questions related to security are considered in their entirety and comprise all aspects relating to politico-military issues (including confidence and security building measures and arms control), as well as the economic and the human dimensions.<sup>421</sup> Furthermore various aspects of security are seen as interconnected and interdependent – security is regarded as indivisible.<sup>422</sup>

The CSCE formally opened in Helsinki in 1973. Experts from the 35 participating states engaged in what amounted to the first ever-multilateral East-West negotiation process; the end result was the CSCE Final Act.

The Helsinki Final Act encompassed three main sets of recommendations, commonly referred to as “baskets”:

#### 1. Questions relating to security in Europe;

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<sup>418</sup> Echverria, op. cit. note 414, p.17.

<sup>419</sup> OSCE Handbook 2001, Vienna: OSCE, p.1.

<sup>420</sup> Ibid.

<sup>421</sup> Monika Wohfeld and Elizabeth Abela, “The Mediterranean Dimension of the OSCE: Confidence Building in the Euro-Mediterranean Region,” in *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, p.77.

<sup>422</sup> OSCE Handbook, op. cit. note 419, p. 2.

2. Cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology and the environment;
3. Cooperation in humanitarian and other fields.

The first basket laid out fundamental principles that guide the relations between the participating states which were:

1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;
2. Refraining from the threat or use of force;
3. Inviolability of frontiers;
4. Territorial integrity of states;
5. Peaceful settlement of disputes;
6. Non-intervention in internal affairs;
7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief;
8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
9. Cooperation among states;
10. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.

And it was the first time that the CBMs received considerable international attention.<sup>423</sup>

The CBMs document in the Helsinki Final Act, the first generation of politico-military CBMs, called for a set of voluntary measures that consisted of voluntary prior notification of (21 days) of major manoeuvres, major military movements and the invitation of observers to major military manoeuvres. These information measures were to create more openness and transparency in order to reduce fears of surprise attack resulting from major manoeuvres.<sup>424</sup>

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<sup>423</sup> Winrow, op. cit. note 10, p.37.

<sup>424</sup> Hans Günter Brauch, "From Confidence to Partnership Building Measures in Europe and the Mediterranean: Conceptual and Political Efforts Revisited," in *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, p.37.

After Helsinki, the dialogue continued and further steps were agreed in Stockholm in 1986 where the further elaboration of notification and invitation to military activities resulted in obligatory CSBMs.<sup>425</sup> A major breakthrough was the acceptance by the USSR, for the first time, of on site inspection on its territory with no right of refusal.<sup>426</sup> In the Vienna Document 1990, agreement was reached for an exchange of military information of land and airforces.<sup>427</sup>

The Vienna Document 1994 urges states to demonstrate transparency and predicability in their military activities by setting out parameters for annual exchange of military information, information on plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems and exchange of information on defence planning. For the transmission of information on agreed measures, a communication network was set up for direct communications between the capitals of the participating states.<sup>428</sup>

The second basket was about cooperation in a number of other fields including economics, science, technology, and the environment. The participating states agreed to promote trade, the exchange of economic and commercial information and industrial cooperation; to improve opportunities for the exchange and dissemination of scientific information; and to take the necessary measures to bring together environmental policies.<sup>429</sup>

The OSCE is not an economic organization. Nonetheless, as a part of its comprehensive approach to security, it addresses economic and environmental issues. It is expected that economic and environmental solidarity and cooperation can

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<sup>425</sup> Wohfeld and Abela, op. cit. note 412, p.86

<sup>426</sup> Brauch, op. cit. note 421, p.38.

<sup>427</sup> Wohfeld and Abela, op. cit. note 412, p.86.

<sup>428</sup> Ibid.

<sup>429</sup> OSCE Handbook, op. cit 419, p.134.

contribute to peace and stability; economic and environmental problems can contribute to increasing tensions within or among states.<sup>430</sup>

The economic dimension of the OSCE involves monitoring of economic and environmental developments among participating states to detect any threat of conflict; and to facilitate the formulation of economic and environmental policies promoting security in the OSCE area. The OSCE organizes conferences and seminars on economic and environmental matters; promotes adherence to shared standards and norms for economic and environmental behaviour and maintains contacts with other international organizations. Its main instruments are Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities and the Economic Forum as well as an annual Senior Council meeting on the transition to free market economies.<sup>431</sup>

The term “Human Dimension” refers to the commitments made by OSCE participating states to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to abide by the rule of law, to promote the principles of democracy and, in this regard, to build, strengthen and protect democratic institutions, as well as to promote tolerance throughout the OSCE area.<sup>432</sup>

In the third basket, the participating states expressed their conviction that “increased cultural and educational exchange, broader dissemination of information, contacts between people, and the solution of humanitarian problems will all contribute to the strengthening of peace and understanding among peoples.” In order to achieve this goal, 25 specific standards were formulated, on a wide range of subjects including family reunification, freedom of travel, improvement of conditions for tourism, access to and exchange of information and increased cooperation in the fields of culture and education. This was one of the major achievements of the

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<sup>430</sup> Wohfeld and Abela, *op. cit.* note 412, p.89.

<sup>431</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90.

Helsinki Process. Human rights and fundamental freedoms had never before been the subject of direct East- West talks.<sup>433</sup>

Since 1990 the OSCE has developed institutions and mechanisms to promote respect for the commitments, such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Representatives on Freedom of the Media and the Missions and other field presences.<sup>434</sup>

In November 1999, at the Istanbul Summit, the OSCE Heads of State and Government signed the Charter for European Security, in order to define better role of the OSCE. The Charter aimed at strengthening the Organization's ability to prevent conflicts, to settle them and to rehabilitate societies ravaged by war and destruction.<sup>435</sup>

The OSCE today occupies a unique in the place of world of international organizations in general and in the realm of European security institutions in particular. This stems from its broad membership, comprehensive approach to security, conflict prevention instruments, tradition of open dialogue and consensus building, shared norms and values among its participating states, and well-developed patterns of contacts and cooperation with other organizations and institutions. The basic priorities of the OSCE at the present are:

- to consolidate the participating states' common values and held in building fully democratic civil societies based on the rule of law;
- to prevent local conflicts, restore stability and bring peace to war torn areas;

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<sup>432</sup> Ibid., 87.

<sup>433</sup> OSCE Handbook, op. cit. 419, p.102.

<sup>434</sup> Ibid, p.101.

<sup>435</sup> Ibid.,p.19.

- to overcome real and perceived security deficits and to avoid the creation of new political, economic or social divisions by promoting a cooperative system of security.<sup>436</sup>

## **4.2. The Helsinki Process and its Contribution to the End of the Cold War**

The CSCE process was one of the main catalysts that fostered security and cooperation in Europe and overcome the ideological division of Europe in the 1970s and 1980s and brought about the end of the Cold war.<sup>437</sup>

The CBMs in the East-West conflict performed a specific function of reducing the likelihood of the perceived threat of a surprise attack. They focused on information, notification, communication, access and constraint measures. Within the CSCE the CBMs initiated a process of negotiation and consultations on sensitive military matters with the active participation of high level military officers.<sup>438</sup> In particular the third basket played a complementary role. As a result, the Helsinki process played an important role in ending the Cold war.<sup>439</sup>

## **4.3. OSCE and the Mediterranean**

From the beginning of the Helsinki Process, the CSCE commenced a special relationship with a number of countries from the southern rim of the Mediterranean linking European security with that of the Mediterranean.<sup>440</sup> Due to the geographical proximity, as well as historical, cultural, economic and political ties of OSCE

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<sup>436</sup> Ibid.,p.17-18.

<sup>437</sup> Ibid., p.12

<sup>438</sup> Brauch, op. cit. note 424, p.45.

<sup>439</sup> OSCE Handbook, op. cit. note 419, p. 103.



countries with the Mediterranean region, a chapter on “Questions relating to security and cooperation in the Mediterranean” was included in the Helsinki Final Act (1975).<sup>441</sup>

In it the participating states stated their conviction that “security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean as a whole and that accordingly the process of improving security should not be confined to Europe but should extend to other parts of world and in particular the Mediterranean area”<sup>442</sup>.

Further they noted the interest expressed by the non-participating states in the Conference since its inception and declared their intention to promote the development of good-neighbourly relations with the non-participating Mediterranean states, to increase mutual confidence, to increase so as to promote security and stability in the Mediterranean area as a whole. The participating states also declared their intention to encourage with the non-participating Mediterranean states the development of mutually beneficial cooperation in the various fields of economic activity. Cooperation in the fields of industry, science, technology and environment was also emphasized.<sup>443</sup>

The participating states also declared their intention of maintaining and amplifying the contacts and dialogue with the purpose of contributing to peace, reducing armed forces in the region, strengthening security, lessening tensions in the region and widening the scope of cooperation.<sup>444</sup>

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<sup>440</sup> Contributions were received and statements were heard from the following non-participating Mediterranean states on various items: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia.

<sup>441</sup> Wohfeld and Abela, op. cit note 412, p.79.

<sup>442</sup> Helsinki Final Act, 1975, p.39.

<sup>443</sup> Ibid., pp.39-40.

<sup>444</sup> Ibid.

In the follow up meetings after Helsinki, the Mediterranean states were invited to make written and oral contributions. Between 1975 and 1994, specific meetings were held on Mediterranean issues, mostly relating to the economic, environmental, scientific and cultural issues, in addition to practical ways of cooperation between the Mediterranean states and the CSCE. These took place in Valletta in 1979; in Venice in 1984, in Palma de Mallorca in 1990 and in Valletta in 1993.<sup>445</sup>

In the 1990 Charter of Paris, the participating states maintained that they “will continue efforts to strengthen security and cooperation in the Mediterranean as an important factor for stability in Europe.”

A process of structuring relations began in 1992, with the Helsinki Document 1992 opening the way for participation of the Mediterranean states in CSCE Review Conferences. At the 25<sup>th</sup> Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) meeting in Prague in 1994, after examining requests from the five non-participating states (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia), the participating states decided to invite the Mediterranean countries to a series of CSCE activities in order to forge a closer relationship. Thus the non-participating states were invited to Council of Ministers meetings, review conferences, regular meetings with the Troika and on a case-by-case, to seminars and other ad hoc meetings in which they had a special interest. The Mediterranean states were given access to all CSCE documents and the right to submit views to Chairmen-in-Office.<sup>446</sup>

In December 1994 at the landmark Budapest Summit of the CSCE – which was renamed the OSCE- decisions were taken to enhance the dialogue with the

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<sup>445</sup> Elizabeth Abela, “OSCE’s Mediterranean Activities,” in *The Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Security Dialogue*, p.7.

<sup>446</sup> Wohfeld and Abela, op. cit. note 412, p.80.

Mediterranean.<sup>447</sup> Italy, Spain and France were the main advocates of an enhanced relation with the Mediterranean.<sup>448</sup>

The OSCE participating states were to establish an “informal open-ended contact group at the level of experts within the framework of the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna. This group would meet periodically with representatives of the non-participating Mediterranean states to conduct a dialogue and facilitate the exchange of information.”<sup>449</sup>

This new framework for cooperation was established in order to intensify dialogue with the Mediterranean states, and also foresaw the organization of Mediterranean Seminars on topics of mutual interest, as well as high level consultations between the OSCE, represented by the Troika and the Secretary General and the Mediterranean partners.<sup>450</sup>

To avoid the negative connotation of “Non-Participating Mediterranean States”, the Permanent Council adopted a decision on 5 December 1995 which renamed them “Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation” (MPCs).<sup>451</sup>

Although the meetings of the Contact Group with the Mediterranean partners for cooperation are informal, a number of participating states, including the MPCs, are represented at ambassadorial level and all six MPCs regularly attend its meetings. The agenda of the Contact Group meetings with the MPCs includes a briefing by a representative of the Chairmen-in-Office with information on most recent events, in particular OSCE missions and field activities. This is followed by a presentation by an OSCE official on one of the main aspects of the OSCE’s activity, such as by the

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<sup>447</sup> Winrow, op. cit. note 10, p147

<sup>448</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, op. cit. note 6, p.37

<sup>449</sup> Winrow, op. cit. note 10, p.147.

<sup>450</sup> OSCE Handbook, op. cit. note 419, p.164.

<sup>451</sup> Ibid.,p165.

Representative on Freedom of Media, the coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental activities or a Personal Representative of the Chairmen-in-Office.<sup>452</sup>

As part of the OSCE effort a seminar was organized in Cairo in 1995 on OSCE's experience in the field of confidence building measures. This seminar was followed by other seminars: In 1996, in Tel Aviv "The OSCE as a Platform for Dialogue and the Fostering of Norms of Behaviour"; in 1997, in Cairo "The Security Model for the 21<sup>ST</sup> Century: Implications for the Mediterranean Basin"; in 1998, in Malta "The Human Dimension of Security Promoting Democracy and the rule of Law"; in Amman, in 1999 "Implementation of Human Dimension Commitments"; in Portoro, in 2000 "The Confidence-Building Measures and Confidence- and Security- Building Measures: The OSCE Experience and its Relevance for the Mediterranean Region."

The MPCs are also invited to attend relevant meetings in all the three dimensions of the OSCE. They attend the annual meetings of the Economic Forum held in Prague, which reviews the implementation of commitments undertaken in Economic Dimension. They participate in the Human Dimension Implementation Meetings and the supplementary Human Dimension Meetings. Parliamentarians of the MPCs are also invited to a number of events organized by the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, such as the Annual Sessions and other meetings.<sup>453</sup>

On June 1998, the Permanent Council adopted a decision providing for representatives of the MPCs to form a part of an OSCE/ODHIR election observation team. The MPCs have been encouraged to take advantage of this decision by actively participating in and thus benefiting from the experience of the OSCE in the field.<sup>454</sup>

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<sup>452</sup> Wohfeld nad Elizabeth, op. cit. note 412, p80.

<sup>453</sup> Abela, op. cit. note 445, p.10.

<sup>454</sup> OSCE Handbook, p.165.

In the Declaration of the Istanbul Summit, in November 1999, the interdependence between security in Europe and the Mediterranean was once more underscored. This document stated that: “In the light of our relationship with our Mediterranean Partners, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, we reaffirm that strengthening security and cooperation in the Mediterranean area is of major importance to the stability in the OSCE area. We therefore intend to enhance our dialogue and joint activities with them.”<sup>455</sup>

Little was achieved in transferring the experience and knowledge of traditional CBMs where the OSCE has much expertise. Indeed, OSCE has not attempted to make use of the CSCE/OSCE experience in Europe and apply it to the Mediterranean.<sup>456</sup> A number of participating states argues that the OSCE experience, both in military and non-military aspects of confidence building could be applicable to the Mediterranean region.<sup>457</sup>

Most Arab analysts reject the introduction of military confidence building measures under conditions of disequilibrium and territorial annexation. They argue that CBMs are a status-quo oriented concept.<sup>458</sup> The resolution of issues relating to the Arab-Israeli dispute is a prerequisite for the confidence building process. And also, as long as Israel has nuclear monopoly, there will be no basis for a genuine Arab-Israeli confidence building and peace.<sup>459</sup>

They are particularly suspicious of military transparency, which are perceived as instruments to gain intelligence and unilateral advantage. Thus, they oppose the idea of providing a potential adversary with detailed information on their military

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<sup>455</sup> OSCE Istanbul Summit, November 1999

<sup>456</sup> Winrow, op. cit. note 10, p.208.

<sup>457</sup> Wohfeld and Abela, op. cit note 412, p.78.

<sup>458</sup> Selim, op. cit. note 254, p.137.

<sup>459</sup> Biad, op. cit note 413, p.122.

capability. Equally, Americans, Europeans and Israelis already have access to information on military capability through satellites and technical intelligence.<sup>460</sup>

The Arab states argue that the East-West model of confidence building was successful because three conditions were realised:

- the participating states agreed to respect present borders resulting from the Second World War;
- there was a balance of military forces between NATO and the Warsaw pact;
- there was no military conflict among Europeans.

These conditions do not exist in the Mediterranean. Hence insecurity in the Mediterranean can not be managed by simply transferring the CSCE model of military CBMs to the Mediterranean.<sup>461</sup> The Arab analysts believe in that political conditions prevailing in the region may allow for the institution of CBMs intended to improve political, economic and cultural relations than CBMs basically related to military aspects of inter-state relations.<sup>462</sup> A number of experts consider the possibility of introducing traditional CBMs in the Mediterranean currently as unrealistic. Regional players indicate that “the absence of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace precludes parties in the region from applying the progressive CBMs that have proved effective in the framework of the OSCE.”<sup>463</sup>

Over the years, however, while dialogue moved ahead, concrete action has been slow in coming. Due to the political developments of 1989, the CSCE largely concentrated on Europe, rather than on the Mediterranean.<sup>464</sup> Although the MPCs emphasized that bridging economic and technological differences and reducing disparities and containing the dangers of environmental pollution between the two

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<sup>460</sup> Ibid., 123.

<sup>461</sup> Ibid., p.126.

<sup>462</sup> Ibid., p.125.

<sup>463</sup> Ibid. p.92.

regions are needed for the stability in the Mediterranean region, the OSCE has limited means to react to these concerns.<sup>465</sup> It seems that priorities of the OSCE lie elsewhere. In its web page there are links to the Balkans, Central and Eastern Europe and even in central Asia and Caucasus, but not the Mediterranean. However the OSCE dialogue can contribute to increasing relations between north and the south. The OSCE Mediterranean Seminars provide a dialogue opportunity not only to the OSCE officials and the MPCs, but also to the EU, NATO, WEU, UN officials and civil societies to discuss the Mediterranean issues. In this respect it can fill an important gap and enable the participants to coordinate their actions and share their experiences on their own dialogues.

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<sup>464</sup> Wohfeld and Abela, op. cit note 412, p.78.

<sup>465</sup> Ibid.,p.90

## CONCLUSIONS

The end of the Cold War created an optimistic atmosphere in Europe. It was expected that the new era would create an opportunity for cooperation among the former enemies and that would cause more security and stability in Europe. But, unfortunately, this optimism has not lasted for a long time. Security and stability were achieved, to some extent, in the Central and Eastern Europe, but the Gulf Crisis, the Algerian case and the turmoil in the Balkans have shown that Europe was not secure at all.

These events forced the western analysts, institutions and policy makers to contemplate on the security challenges of the new era, which mostly stem from the Mediterranean region, once more. The security challenges are not only military issues but also non-military matters. They are transnational and interdependent. Hence comprehensive approach to security is necessary.

The proliferation of WMD and their delivery means, even though it is not a direct threat at the moment for Europe, because of its possible indirect implications, is one of the concerns. The increasing energy dependency of the European countries to the region is another serious matter. Terrorism, drug trafficking, organizational crime; the increasing economic gap between the North and the South; the increasing population, the high unemployment rates, political instability, strengthening fundamentalism and radical Islam, environmental problems etc. in the region are some of the others. To deal with these challenges some of the western institutions started initiatives towards the region.



As a result of the end of the Cold War, the Arab countries have significantly lost strategic weight in the eyes of the former superpowers. They were not able to exploit the East-West tension any more. Their economies were deteriorating day by day which meant social unrest at home. As a result of this the public questioned the legitimacy of the undemocratic leaders. The governors were not able to tackle with the domestic as well as regional problems. The fortunate 1991 Madrid Agreement and the 1993 Oslo Accords paved the way for a cooperation with the rich northern neighbours and they acted in this way.

In this regard, in 1995 NATO started a dialogue with five of the Mediterranean states. Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Later on Jordan and Algeria participated in. The dialogue consists of political dialogue and participation in specific activities. The purpose of the NATO Mediterranean Initiative is to achieve better mutual understanding with the countries to the south and to contribute to the strengthening of stability in the Mediterranean region by making the Alliance's aims and objectives better understood. But the US led military nature of the organization, in addition to lack of will and coherence among the member states, lack of solid goals and funds make its future highly questionable. The Arab countries look at the dialogue as a tool that can be useful in increasing relations with the rich northern states.

The most ambitious institutional initiative, which copies the CSCE/CSCM method<sup>466</sup>, was initiated by the EU with the twelve Mediterranean partners in 1995. The main aim of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is to promote long term stability through economic development. Economic development is assumed to have spillovers in political, social and security terms by providing more opportunities for jobs at home (thus easing migratory pressures), raising the standards of living, and

decreasing the attractiveness of extremist ideologies. The initiative is designed to promote an integrated economic area that fosters closer cooperation on political, social and economic issues. The most noteworthy aspect of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership is its long-term and comprehensive approach.<sup>467</sup> It has the necessary economic instruments to deal with the root causes of the problems. However, lack of political will and coherence among the member states slow down the process. For the EU, like NATO, priorities lie elsewhere: Central and Eastern Europe. There are serious problems in the Mediterranean region, but not serious enough to waste more money and time.

The OSCE also has a Mediterranean Dialogue. There have been no dramatic developments in the OSCE-Mediterranean Dialogue since the landmark Budapest summit in December 1994.<sup>468</sup> It seems that the priorities of the OSCE lie elsewhere. The OSCE tends to put the Mediterranean on the same level of importance as Japan and South Korea.<sup>469</sup> Even though it follows a comprehensive approach to security, it doesn't have the necessary means to tackle with the region's problems.

Most if not all security problems in the Mediterranean are not military ones but economic and political in nature.<sup>470</sup> As it was admitted by the former NATO Secretary-General the EU is the key player in the Mediterranean given that most of the security challenges in the area stem from deteriorating social and economic conditions. Thus, according to Solana, the EU's Barcelona Process is the central multilateral initiative involving in the Mediterranean.<sup>471</sup> The advantage of the EU is paradoxically that it is not a security organization and thus is better qualified to

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<sup>466</sup> Barbe, op. cit. note 313, p.26.

<sup>467</sup> Larabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, op. cit. note 6, p.26

<sup>468</sup> Winrow, op. cit. note 10, p.205

<sup>469</sup> Fenech, op. cit. note 330, p.172.

<sup>470</sup> Stephen Blank, "The Mediterranean and its Security," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol: 12, No:1, Winter 2000, p.25.

<sup>471</sup> Solana, op. cit. note 11, p.44.

tackle the roots of instability that give rise to security concerns, as it is seeking to do through its Euro-Mediterranean Partnership project.<sup>472</sup>

Progress in the economic and financial chapter as well as on social, cultural and human affairs of the Barcelona Process can enable the institutions to advance more firmly in the military security dialogue to limit the severe North-South perception of risks and the development of partnership building measures, CBMs and CSBMs that would allow, not only conflict prevention, but also preparation of the path for arms control and disarmament in the Mediterranean.<sup>473</sup>

NATO and OSCE can only play a complementary role in the region. NATO, in parallel with the developments in the Barcelona Process can increase the number and range of practical cooperation which brings together military officials. The OSCE, because of its good image in the south, can provide a platform for discussing sensitive issues such as human rights, freedom of speech, freedom of media, what CBMs mean etc. But, cooperation, rather than competition, is vital for the effectiveness of the attempts. In this regard, an establishment of a permanent body, which brings together officials from the institutions and the dialogue countries, can enhance the progress of the initiatives.

Institutions can provide peace and stability to the extent that they create interdependence and serve the interests of all the participants. In the Mediterranean case, all the attempts reflect northern security concern, rather than seriously considering the southern interests. This combined with lack of coherence among the member states, lack of political will and reluctance of wasting more money diminishes the effectiveness of the institutions. On the other side of the Mediterranean, the undemocratic character of the regimes, lack of epidemic

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<sup>472</sup> Richard Gillespie, "The Euro-Mediterranean Initiative," in *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Political and Economic Perspectives*, p.4.

community, insufficient civil society, lack of culture of cooperation, the colonial memories of the past impede significant progress. Cultural and religious differences between the both sides of the Mediterranean also cause reluctance for cooperation among the participants.

Advances in the Middle East peace process and in south-south cooperation are indispensable. The murder of Israel's Prime Minister Rabin and the election of a successor had frozen the peace process and this overshadowed all North-South trans-Mediterranean negotiations.<sup>474</sup> Until now, none of the initiatives has been able to affect positively the peace process and will not be able to do so in the near future. But they all have been vulnerable to the developments in the peace process. The second Intifada that began on 28 September 2001 worsened the situation. Progress in the Mediterranean depends on the Middle East Peace Process.<sup>475</sup> Only after a real peace can significant progress be expected from the institutional initiatives.

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<sup>473</sup> Ibid. p.76.

<sup>474</sup> Hans Günter Brauch, Antonio Marquina and Abdelwahab Biad, "Introduction: Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," in *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, p. 12.

<sup>475</sup> Biad, op. cit. note 413, p.127

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